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JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN FISHERIES
LITIGATION: PROS, CONS, AND
PRESTIDIGITATION?
Marian Macpherson and Mariam McCall*
[In our Constitutional system the commitment to separation of
powers is too fundamental for us to preempt congressional action
by judicially decreeing what accords with 'common sense and the
public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibilities in the
political branches. - Chief Justice Burger'
. INTRODUCTION
On August 7, 2000, a federal district judge in Seattle enjoined trawling
for Alaska groundfish, one of the biggest commercial fisheries in the
world.2 In September 1998, a federal district judge in Virginia issued an
order increasing the quota for the summer flounder fishery by almost
400,000 pounds.3 In 1999 and 2000, a federal district judge in Hawaii
issued a series of five court orders closing large portions of the Pacific
ocean to fishing and establishing an evolving regime of incredibly specific
fishery management measures.4 In 2002, a federal judge in the District of
Columbia issued, then rescinded, an order imposing fifty specific manage-
ment measures on the New England groundfish fishery ranging from bag
* Marian Macpherson is currently a Management and Program Analyst for the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). At the time of writing this article, she was an Attorney-
Adviser in the Office of the General Counsel for Fisheries, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration. Mariam McCall is Deputy Assistant General Counsel for
Sustainable Fisheries, in the Office of the General Counsel for Fisheries, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration. The views expressed in this paper are their own, and in
no way reflect the opinions of the agency.
1. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978).
2. Greenpeace v. NMFS, No. C98-492Z (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7, 2000).
3. N.C. Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 27 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Va. 1998) [hereinafter North
Carolina Fisheries l].
4. Greenpeace v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Haw. 2000).
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limits, to closed areas, to observer coverage requirement.5 The growing
number of court orders that appear to judicially manage our federal
fisheries requires us to consider these remedies in light of Constitutional
notions of separation of powers, as well as to consider their practical
implications. Understanding these injunctions and what they mean requires
an exploration of the roots of agency regulatory authority, a review of the
statutes governing federal fisheries management, and a review of the recent
lines of cases resulting in these surprising remedies. This paper will
provide this overview, then consider the outcomes of these cases from the
perspectives of the litigants, the public, and the resource.6
I. BACKGROUND
In the United States, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
manages our federal fisheries pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act),7 a ground-
breaking statute that sets up a system of regional fishery management
councils composed of various stakeholders in the fishing community and
empowers the Councils to use a public process to develop recommended
regulations for fisheries under their jurisdictions.' The statute is designed
to encourage science and policy debates taking place at the stakeholder
level, well in advance of agency rulemaking.
Since 1996, NMFS has been the subject of a dramatically increasing
number of lawsuits. Several key factors influencing this increase in
fisheries litigation include: the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments
5. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.C. Cit. 2002).
6. The authors note that because this paper is focused on the issue of judicial remedies,
the only cases discussed are those which the agency lost, with an emphasis on those that
resulted in injunctions. This limited discussion might present a somewhat skewed picture
of the National Marine Fisheries Services' overall litigation record. Overall, NMFS has a
winning record with respect to fisheries management issues. For example, in 2002, there
were eighteen decisions in lawsuits regarding NMFS's management of federal fisheries,
including three that addressed the interface of the ESA with fisheries management. Of these
eighteen decisions, NMFS won ten, lost five, experienced two with mixed results, and had
one dismissed.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1802 (2001).
8. It has been suggested that negotiated rulemaking should be used to resolve issues
involving the use of Federal fisheries resources. See, e.g., Sebastian O'Kelly, Old Conflicts
Stymie NMFS' Industry Progress, COM. FISHERIES NEWS, Apr. 2001, at 7A. However, the
council system established by the Magnuson-Stevens Act is essentially negotiated
rulemaking, though some might argue that not all perspectives are fairly represented at the
table. (Author's note).
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to the Magnuson-Stevens Act,9 which established new conservation
requirements for fishery management plans to meet; the 1996 amendments
to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, adding a judicial remedy to enforce the
requirement that federal agencies analyze economic impacts on small
entities;' ° and a large influx of money to environmental organizations to
support a coordinated legal effort to "restore marine ecosystems and
fisheries."'" Due in part to these changes, a new genre of fishery litigants
has emerged on the scene that includes interests as diverse as North Pacific
factory trawlers, Gulf of Mexico sport fishermen, and environmental
groups such as Greenpeace and Natural Resources Defense Council. For
a variety of reasons, these litigants have chosen not to pursue their desired
changes through the Magnuson-Stevens Act's council process, but rather
to proceed to court. This new wave of litigation has led to a variety of far-
reaching injunctions, including massive closures of areas in the Pacific
Ocean and court-ordered modifications of fishing quotas in the Atlantic.
Our discussion of modem fisheries injunctions begins with an overview
of the source of agency regulatory authority, a description of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act and other applicable laws that govern Federal
fisheries management, and a brief description of traditional judicial
remedies.
A. Source ofAgency Regulatory Authority
The source of agency regulatory authority in the United States traces
back to the Constitution. The Constitution vests the power to prescribe
laws solely with the legislative branch. For certain complex regulatory
programs, Congress establishes the general legal requirements, then
delegates authority for administering the programs, and hammering out the
details, to executive branch agencies. The judicial branch may review
agency actions to determine whether the agency has complied with the
9. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
10. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-
121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996).
11. In 1991 John Wisewrote: "ThereisnoFriendsoftheHaddock." J.WISE, FEDERAL
CONsERvATION AND MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FIsHERIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 10 (C.
Center for Marine Conservation, 1991). Things have changed for the Haddock over the past
decade. In 2001, we have the Pew Charitable Trusts, a modem day "Friends of the
Haddock." According to Nils Stolpe, The Pew Charitable Trusts have given Earthjustice
Legal Defense Fund $9.797 million, much of which went to support the Ocean Law Project,
a coordinated legal effort to restore marine ecosystems and fisheries. Nils Stolpe, Who Puts
Up the Money?: Environmental Lawsuits Backed by BIG Bucks, COM. FISHERiEs NEWS, Apr.
2001, at 12A.
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statutory parameters Congress established; however, the judicial branch
may not review these sorts of agency actions from a policy perspective. If
an agency action is found to be in violation of the law, then a court may
invalidate the action or impose various other sorts of relief, but must stop
short of substituting its judgment for that of the agency on a matter
delegated to the agency's discretion.
In Marbury v. Madison, the seminal case on separation of powers,
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote:
By the [C]onstitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country
in his political character, and to his own conscience .... In such
cases, [the acts of his officers] are his acts; and whatever opinion
may be entertained of manner in which executive discretion may
be used, still there exists, and can exist no power to control that
discretion .... [W]here the heads of departments are the political
or confidential agents of the executive.., to act in cases in which
the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing
can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically
examinable.12
Our modem legal system still espouses the notion that courts are not
appropriate for resolving political or policy questions. Yet the question of
relief remains. A court must have some power to enforce its decisions.
The rest of this paper will explore the intricate balancing act that the courts
and the agency must walk in navigating the unique realm of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act.
B. Overview of Fishery Management Regime
1. The Magnuson-Stevens Act
The Magnuson-Stevens Act is designed to encourage user-group self-
regulation within legislatively prescribed scientific and policy-based
parameters. The statute establishes eight regional fishery management
councils (Councils) and gives them responsibility for designing manage-
ment measures to achieve the "optimum yield" (OY) from the fishery while
preventing over-fishing. Congress delegated to NMFS and the Councils
broad scientific and policy discretion on issues ranging from the identifica-
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165--66(1803).
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tion of a "management unit" to the valuation of social and ecological
factors in determining "optimum yield."' 3 As long as the measures the
Councils recommend are consistent with the provisions of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act, including its national standards described below and other
applicable law, the Secretary must approve them. He may not substitute an
alternate management strategy of his own, unless he determines that further
management is necessary and the Council fails to act within a reasonable
time. Once the Secretary reaches the stage of implementing his own
management regime, he too has broad discretion in determining how to
meet the goals of the Magnuson-Stevens Act within the constraints of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act's standards and other applicable law.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act's national standards'4 set forth an array of
competing policy goals that Councils and NMFS must balance, some of
which Congress has accorded greater priority than others. The standards
require that fishery management measures: (1) prevent overfishing while
achieving optimum yield; (2) be based on the best available scientific
information; (3) manage individual stocks of fish and interrelated stocks of
fish as a unit to the extent practicable; (4) ensure that allocations, to the
extent they are necessary, are fair and equitable, reasonably calculated to
promote conservation, and carried out so that no individual acquires
excessive shares; (5) consider efficiency in the utilization of the resource
where practicable, except that no measure may have economic allocation
as its sole purpose; (6) take into account and allow for variations and
contingencies; (7) where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unneces-
sary duplication; (8) consistent with the conservation requirements of this
act (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding of overfished
stocks), take into account the importance of fishery resources to fishing
communities in order to provide for their sustained participation, and to the
extent practicable, minimize adverse economic impacts on such communi-
ties; (9) to the extent practicable, minimize bycatch, and minimize the
mortality of bycatch that cannot be avoided; and (10) to the extent
practicable, promote the safety of human life at sea.' 5
While these standards prescribe a range of considerations fishery
managers must consider, the statutory language gives priority to the Act's
conservation goals. The italicized phrases above demonstrate the ample
discretion delegated to the Councils and NMFS.
A notable aspect of the Magnuson-Stevens Act that sets it apart from
other resource management statutes such as National Forest Management
13. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1802(28); 50 C.F.R. §§ 600.305-.310 (2002).
14. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a) (2000).
15. Id. (emphasis added).
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Act 6 and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act" is that, absent
some affirmative agency action, fisheries in federal waters go unregulated.
The default status of fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is
open access, allowing unrestricted harvests. When NMFS takes an action
pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, it imposes a restriction that
otherwise would not exist. In contrast, public lands are considered to be
"owned" by the United States, and the Federal agencies charged with
managing them must take an action to authorize consumptive use. What
this means for fisheries litigation and remedies is that, in some cases, when
a court strikes down an agency action, there may be no management
measure left in its place to restrict consumptive use.
2. Other Applicable Law
In addition to the considerations required by the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, a variety of other laws impose additional procedural and substantive
limitations on NMFS's regulatory discretion, and are therefore relevant to
the discussion on what relief is available.
a. APA
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prescribes basic requirements
to ensure public participation in the development of agencies' regulations.
In general, whenever an agency plans to implement a rule or regulation that
will have "general applicability and future effect," the agency is required
to publish a notice of the proposed action in the Federal Register and give
the public an opportunity to comment on the proposal. 8
In addition, the APA provides for judicial review of agency actions and
delineates appropriate remedies. It states that a "reviewing court shall
compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed," and
"hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right; (C) in
excess of statutory jurisdiction; (D) without observance of procedure
required by law; (E) unsupported by substantial evidence;" or "(F)
unwarranted by the facts."' 9
16. 16 U.S.C. § 472(a)-(i) (2000).
17. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-552 (1994).
19. Id. § 706. The last two of these failures are not available for challenges to actions
taken pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act. The Magnuson-Stevens Act specifies that
only the first four provide potential basis for challenge. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(t)(1)(B) (2000).
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Thus the APA specifically authorizes a court to set aside an agency's
action, or to compel a specific action unlawfully withheld. However, it
specifically does not authorize a judge to grant relief that any other statute
specifically or impliedly forbids.2
In general, when reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute the
agency is charged with implementing, courts defer to the agency's
interpretation unless that interpretation clearly violates express statutory
mandates.2' In addition, courts defer to agencies in matters requiring
scientific or technical expertise.22
b. NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that an
agency undertaking any "major federal action significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment" prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) describing the effects of the proposed action as well as the
reasonable alternatives to the proposal.' In accordance with the implemen-
tation regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), if the
agency can demonstrate through a preliminary analysis called an environ-
mental assessment (EA) that the action will not result in a "significant
impact" on the environment (finding of no significant impact/FONSI) then
the full-blown EIS need not be prepared. NEPA does not require that the
more environmentally attractive alternatives be selected - only that the
reasonable range of alternatives and their impacts be analyzed, considered,
and discussed on the record, and public comments be considered, before the
agency makes its final decision.
c. RFA
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires that agencies promulgat-
ing rules through notice and comment rulemaking consider the economic
impact of their proposed actions on "small entities," and explain why less
burdensome alternatives have not been selected. 25 As defined under the
statute, "small entities" include small, independently owned businesses,
20. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
21. Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
22. See American Oceans Campaign v. Daley, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2000)
(citing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) "It is not for the
judicial branch to undertake comparative evaluations of conflicting scientific evidence.").
See also NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting NRDC v. EPA, 812
F.2d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2002).
24. See NEPA and Agency Planning, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2002).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 604 (1994).
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independently owned and operated non-profit organizations, and govern-
ment jurisdictions with populations less than 50,000.26 A business in the
fishing industry is considered "small" if it earns less than three million
dollars per year or has fewer than 500 employees.27 For purposes of
Magnuson-Stevens Act regulations, most fishing businesses are considered
small entities. If an agency certifies that its rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, then it need not
complete the full-blown initial and final regulatory flexibility analyses
(IRFA/FRFA). This is a procedural statute designed to ensure reasoned
decision making and public disclosure and involvement. Like NEPA, it
contains no requirement that any particular alternative be selected - only
that the reasonable alternatives be considered and discussed.
d. ESA
Unlike NEPA and the RFA, the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
imposes both substantive and procedural requirements on agencies when
threatened or endangered species may be affected. Procedurally, the ESA
requires that an agency ensure that its planned actions will not jeopardize
threatened or endangered species or adversely modify their critical
habitat.' When marine species under the jurisdiction of NMFS, such as
marine mammals and sea turtles are involved, the action agency meets this
requirement by "consulting" with NMFS.29 If a consultation results in a
finding that the action could jeopardize the species or adversely modify
critical habitat, the action agency must modify its proposed action with
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" (RPAs) suggested by NMFS, or not
undertake the action.3" Substantively, the ESA strictly regulates the
"taking" of threatened and endangered species.3
The ESA authorizes NMFS to "promulgate such regulations as may be
appropriate to enforce this chapter."32
C. Remedies: Injunction and Mandamus
In general, there are two main types of violations and corresponding
types of relief that litigants allege in administrative law challenges. The
26. Id. § 601.
27. Business Credit and Assistance, 13 C.F.R. §§ 121.201-.601 (2002).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2003).
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1536(b)(4)(A).
31. Id. § 1533(d).
32. Id. § 1540(0.
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violations include: (1) violation of the APA's "arbitrary and capricious" or
"without observance of procedure" standards, which can result in a judge
setting aside the agency's action; and (2) unlawfully withholding a
nondiscretionary action, which can result in a court order to compel the
agency to perform that action. These two types of relief can be thought of
as "injunction" and "mandamus." '33 The availability of relief relates
directly to the delegations of, and restrictions on, agency discretion
discussed above. Before exploring some examples of injunctions and
mandamus in the fisheries context, we will briefly review these two types
of relief.
1. Mandamus
Mandamus, Latin for "we command," is a command to perform a
specific official act or duty. It is a judicial remedy that grants a court
supervisory authority to compel a "person to perform a particular duty
required by law."' In modern times, mandamus orders arise pursuant to
the Mandamus Venue Act,35 or under the functionally similar mandatory
injunction provisions of the APA. 3  Mandamus is a specific relief
compelling specific action and is only available when a government official
has failed to perform a specific non-discretionary duty that he is clearly
obligated to perform.3 It is not appropriate for compelling agencies to
reach a particular conclusion on a matter over which the agency retains
even the smallest amount of discretion. Courts consider mandamus an
extreme remedy, and there are few cases in which it has successfully been
sought. As the Ninth Circuit has opined, "[m]andamus is extraordinary
relief that involves reaching into an agency of the executive branch and
dictating the details of its internal operations."3"
33. There are two types of injunctions: mandatory and prohibitory. A mandatory
injunction, which requires an agency to act affirmatively, is functionally equivalent to the
concept of mandamus. See text accompanying notes 34-38, infra.
34. 52 AM. JuR. 2D Mandamus § 1 (2000).
35. Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 105 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1997).
36. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
37. Mandamus is appropriate only if the reliefrequested isnondiscretionary. Marquez-
Ramos v. Reno, 69 F.3d 477,479 (10th Cir. 1995).
38. Independence Mining Co., 105 F.3d at 506 (citing Independence Mining Co. v.
Babbitt, 885 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (D. Nev. 1995)). In Independence Mining Co., the Ninth
Circuit considered a request for mandamus as a request for compulsory injunctive relief
under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), which provides that a court may compel "agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." 105 F.3d at 507. The court found that the
agency, at some level, had a "general, non-discretionary duty to act on applications...,"
then looked at the question of whether there had been unreasonable delay. Id.
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Although modem day case law on the issue of mandamus is scant,
several cases, two of which involved the Department of Commerce,
illustrate the limitations on the judiciary in compelling specific agency
action. In the 1986 Supreme Court case, Japan Whaling Association v.
American Cetacean Society, the Court reviewed whether the district court
had acted properly in issuing an order to compel the Secretary of Com-
merce to "certify" that Japan had violated the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).39 Under the Pelly Amendment of 1971
(Pelly Amendment), United States law required the Secretary of Commerce
to certify to the President if foreign nationals are conducting fishing
operations that "diminish the effectiveness" of an international fishery
conservation program. Further, under the Packwood Amendment of 1979
(Packwood Amendment), if the certification related to the requirements of
the ICRW, economic sanctions were mandatory.4" The International
Whaling Commission (IWC) had established a quota of zero for the harvest
of certain whales and ordered a commercial whaling moratorium to begin
in 1985.42 Japan objected to these measures and continued to harvest the
whales.43 In 1984, the United States and Japan entered an agreement
according to which Japan would adhere to certain limits on harvest and
completely phase out its commercial whaling operations by 1988." In
exchange, the United States would agree not to impose sanctions under the
Pelly and Packwood Amendments.4 Environmental groups filed suit in
federal district court to compel the Secretary to "certify" Japan and the
lower court granted a writ of mandamus.' The Supreme Court reversed,
concluding that Congress had delegated discretion to the Secretary of
Commerce to determine whether the actions of foreign nationals were
"diminishing the effectiveness" of the fishery conservation program and
that the Secretary's decision to pursue the ICRW's conservation goals by
entering into an agreement with Japan rather than by issuing a certification
was reasonable.47
The Brower v. Evans case involved a question relating to the Secre-
tary's statutory mandate to determine whether the chase and netting of
dolphins was having a significant adverse impact on certain dolphin
39. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
40. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (1994).
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (2000).




46. ld. at 222.
47. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 240.
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stocks." The Secretary, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to
make a determination either way, did not decide. The court held that the
duty to decide was mandatory under the statute, that there was information
that could be considered, and that the Secretary had a duty to gather and
consider it. 9 Failure to do so was arbitrary and capricious." The court
ordered the agency to make a decision one way or the other, but did not
dictate what the outcome of the decision must be."' As a remedy, the court
set aside the Secretary's initial findings "until such time as the Secretary
has had an opportunity to consider [the results of available studies]."52
Two additional cases addressing the mandamus issue are Marquez-
Ramos v. Reno 53 and Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt.5 In Marquez-
Ramos, a prisoner brought suit seeking mandamus to compel the Attorney
General to transfer him to a Mexican prison pursuant to the Treaty on the
Execution of Penal Sentences.55 The treaty provided that if the Attorney
General finds the transfer to be appropriate, then she "shall" transmit a
request for transfer to appropriate officials in the other country.' The
treaty also set forth criteria to consider in deciding whether the transfer
would be appropriate, including: the nature and severity of the offense,
previous criminal record of the prisoner, his medical condition, family
relations, and social factors.5 In deciding whether to grant the requested
mandamus order, the court focused on the issue of whether the relief
requested was discretionary, stating, "[t]he importance of the term
'nondiscretionary' cannot be overstated."58 The court concluded that both
the statute and the treaty required the Attorney General to use discretion;
therefore, the decision was non-ministerial and mandamus was not
appropriate. 59
The Independence Mining Co. case arose under the General Mining
Act of 1872, a statute allowing citizens to stake mining claims on public
lands and, if a valuable mineral deposit is discovered, to apply to the
48. Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001).
49. Id. at 1060.
50. Id. at 1064.
51. Id. at 1066.
52. Id. at 1064.
53. 69 F.3d 477 (10th Cir. 1995).
54. 105 F.3d 502 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Marquez-Ramos, 69 F.3d at 478.
56. Id.
57. ld. at 480.
58. Id. at 479.
59. Id. at481.
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Department of the Interior (DOT) for a patent." The DOI does not issue a
patent until it has determined that the claim is valid based on a mineral
examiner's report.6 In addition, patent applications undergo legal and
secretarial review prior to approval. 62 In 1991 and 1992, the Independence
Mining Company (lMC) filed a series of twelve applications for patents."
As a result of procedural and regulatory changes at the DOI, no final
decision had been made on the applications as of August 1994." IMC filed
suit under the Mandamus Venue Act and under the APA seeking to compel
the DOI to make a determination on the applications.' The apellate court
determined that the delay was not unreasonable under the APA.6 On
appeal, IMC argued that it had a vested right in the patents and that the
Secretary had a non-discretionary duty to issue the patents.67 The district
court held that such rights had not vested and that mandamus was not
appropriate, concluding that the "extraordinary relief of mandamus, which
would require 'reaching into an agency of the executive branch and
dictating the details of its internal operations,' was not warranted in this
case."" The court further described the significance of agency discretion
as follows:
[1]ssuance of the patents prior to a validity determination is not a
ministerial act. An agency "ministerial act" for purposes of
mandamus relief has been defined as a clear, non-discretionary
agency obligation to take a specific affirmative action, which
obligation is positively commanded and "so plainly prescribed as
to be free from doubt." The Secretary has no such ministerial duty
to issue a patent prior to a validity determination. Specifically,
when the "Department has not yet determined officially that all
conditions to issuance of the patents have occurred.... [it] has not
yet reached the point when it is left with the purely ministerial act
of issuing the patent... ." The Secretary's validity determination
requires considerable judgment and discretion to evaluate and
assess the results of the mineral examination, and to ultimately
60. Independence Mining Co., 105 F.3d at 506.
61. Id. at 506-07.
62. Id. at 507.
63. Id. at 505.
64. Id.
65. Independence Mining Co., 105 F.3d at 506-07.
66. Id. at 506.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Independence Mining Co. v. Babbitt, 885 F. Supp. 1356, 1364 (D. Nev.
1995)).
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conclude whether the statutory requirement of a "valuable discov-
ery" has been met.
69
In another Supreme Court case on mandamus, California v. Yamasaki,70
the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's decision to order mandamus,
but the remedy was procedural rather than substantive."' The mandamus
order required the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to conduct
hearings, as required by law, prior to taking preliminary actions to recover
wrongful payments.72 The Court did not direct the Secretary on how to
decide, but only required that he conduct a hearing and decide something.73
2. Injunctions
The injunctive relief envisioned under the APA for arbitrary and
capricious or procedurally flawed agency action is limited to remanding or
setting aside the action being reviewed.74 However, courts dispense a wide
variety of injunctions as "equitable remedies" for all sorts of violations. An
injunction is an order from a court that commands a person to refrain from
doing certain acts or to undertake certain steps to undo a wrong.75 A
mandatory injunction, as opposed to a prohibitory injunction, is one that
requires an affirmative act, and it is generally granted for the purpose of
maintaining or restoring the status quo as it would have been absent some
violation.76 While it is generally recognized that courts have broad
authority to craft appropriate injunctions as equitable remedies, injunctions
must be based on the consideration and balancing of various issues and
interests. Generally, in granting an injunction a court must consider the
necessity of intervention to protect cognizable rights; the character of the
interest to be protected; the risk of irreparable harm; success on the merits
or the likelihood thereof; lack of other adequate remedies at law; balancing
of hardships; and public interest." Injunctions are binding on parties to the
69. Id. at 508-09 (internal citations omitted).
70. 442 U.S. 682 (1979).
71. Id. at698.
72. Id. at 686.
73. Id. at 695-97.
74. The APA states that a court may "hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be: (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right; (C) in excess of
statutory jurisdiction; or (D) without observance of procedure required by law." 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
75. BAuEMrNE's LAW DIcTIONARY 626 (3d ed. 1969).
76. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 5, 12 (2d ed. 2000).
77. Id. § 14. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a judge has broad discretion to issue an
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litigation and are enforceable through contempt of court charges and by
federal marshals. 8 A court cannot compel an action that is prohibited by
law, and a court must consider and record the relevant factors in determin-
ing whether the relief is appropriate."'
We examine these limitations further as we discuss the specific judicial
remedies being crafted in response to Magnuson-Stevens Act, RFA, NEPA,
and ESA violations. Key considerations will be the extent to which these
statutes grant the agency discretion and constrain available judicial relief.
Arguably, whether a court terms its relief "injunction" or "mandamus," if
the result is a mandate for the agency to undertake affirmative regulatory
action, then the specificity of the relief ordered must be examined in light
of controlling statutory limitations.'
injunction upon a showing of success on the merits, irreparable injury, and inadequacy of
legal remedies. See Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th Cir. 1998). In environmen-
tal litigation, some jurisdictions recognize presumptions of harm for violations of statutes
such as NEPA and ESA. See, e.g., Greenpeace v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1136-38
(D. Haw. 2000). In the D.C. Circuit, there is a presumption against continuance of an action
until the agency comes into compliance, and key considerations include whether there might
be "irreversible effects on the environment until possible adverse consequences are known,"
the level of public interest, and remedial purpose. American Oceans Campaign v. Daley,
183 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000) (citing Izaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655
F.2d 346, 364 (1981)). Note that Izaak concerned whether to halt an action pending
completion of an analysis, not a decision to order implementation of a different action during
the interim.
78. Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995). However, if a court could compel an
agency to implement its injunction through rulemaking, then the court's order would have
more far-reaching effect.
79. 42Am .JUR. 2D lnjunCtions § 14(2ded. 2000). See, e.g., Rosen v. Siegel, 106 F.3d
28 (2d Cir. 1997), in which the appellate court struck an injunction due to the lower court's
failure to make requisite findings of fact. Id. at 32. There, the Second Circuit noted:
Mhe district court "in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions shall... set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an
injunction... shall set forth the reasons for its issuance."). This requirement is
essential to effective appellate review: absent explicit findings, we lack a "clear
understanding of the ground or basis of the decision of the trial court." It further
"encourages the trial judge to ascertain the facts with due care and to render a decision
in accord with the evidence and the law."
Id. at 31-32.
80. For example, ifa court orders NMFS to implement a specific fisheries management
program, then that program must comply with the national standards of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act. In addition, it would seem that a court could not exempt NMFS from the
procedural requirements for public participation in the APA and Magnuson-Stevens Act.
(Authors' note).
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M. RECENT LITIGATION
In light of the foregoing discussion on sources of authority and forms
of relief, we will now review several lines of cases that illustrate the variety
of judicial remedies evolving in the world of fisheries, different judicial
perspectives on deference to agency expertise, and the statutory constraints
on agency and judicial discretion that may influence the outcomes of cases
and remedies. Some of the cases discussed below involve a single lawsuit;
others involve complex controversies that have given rise to seemingly
conflicting judicial opinions in different jurisdictions. Our case studies
include the North Pacific Steller sea lion controversy; the multi-jurisdic-
tional summer flounder litigation; the series of shark quota suits; the
Hawaii longline/turtle suit; the Hawaiian monk seal suit, involving both the
bottomfish and crustacean fisheries; the nationwide essential fish habitat
suit; the New England monkfish suit; the West Coast groundfish decision;
and the ongoing New England groundfish case.
A. The Steller Sea Lion Controversy
On August 7, 2000, a decade-long controversy surrounding the
relationship between the North Pacific commercial fisheries and the
endangered Steller sea lion culminated in the court's issuance of an
injunction prohibiting trawling for groundfish within Steller sea lion critical
habitat.81 Pursuant to its authority under the ESA, NMFS implemented this
injunction through a rule published in the Federal Register. 2 Among the
many interesting aspects of this case are the overlapping requirements of
the ESA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the degree of discretion accorded
to agency expertise in light of scientific uncertainty, the type of relief
imposed and the agency's method of complying with the court's order. A
brief history of the sea lion controversy helps put these issues into
perspective.
With respect to the North Pacific groundfish fishery, NMFS plays two
roles. NMFS is both the agency responsible for managing federal fisheries
(the action agency), as well as the agency responsible for protecting
threatened and endangered species such as the Steller sea lion (the
consulting agency). The North Pacific groundfish fisheries have histori-
cally occurred in much of the same area that is designated as critical habitat
for Steller sea lions. For over a decade there has been scientific uncertainty
81. Greenpeace v. NMFS, No. C98-492Z (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7,2000).
82. Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone off Alaska, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,766 (Aug.
15, 2000).
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regarding the relationship between the commercial fisheries and the sea
lions, and the extent to which commercial fishing may have been affecting
the availability of the sea lions' prey.
In 1990, after a decade of precipitous decline in population, Steller sea
lions were listed as threatened under the ESA. NMFS immediately began
implementing protective measures to reduce potentially destructive
interactions with the commercial fisheries that occurred in the same areas
as the sea lions. For instance, NMFS established a three nautical mile no-
entry zone around rookeries and prohibited the shooting of sea lions. The
causes of the sea lions' decline were unclear, and theories ranged from
climate shift to blaming the commercial fisheries for excessive prey
competition.
1. Greenpeace Action
In 1991, NMFS proposed to approve the annual authorization of the
North Pacific groundfish fisheries and a forty percent increase in allowable
harvest, supported by an EA/FONSI8 3 Greenpeace Action filed suit."
Instead of finalizing its proposed action, NMFS allowed the first part of the
fishing year to occur on temporary "interim" quotas. Later it initiated
consultation under the ESA, imposed additional protective measures, and
lowered the proposed quotas.8 5 The district court found that the agency's
conclusions under the ESA and NEPA were reasonable given the facts of
the case." On appeal in 1992, the Ninth Circuit found in favor of the
agency."7 As an aside, the court noted Greenpeace Action's failure to
participate in the public process of the Magnuson-Stevens Act."
83. Greenpeace Action v. Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1992).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1327-28.
86. Id. at 1329.
87. Id. at 1337.
88. Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1334. The court wrote:
We express no opinion as to the propriety of Greenpeace's choice to sue instead of
submitting comments on the TAC and mitigation measures... which could continue
in effect for only three months and thus were amenable to modification. Nevertheless,
we cannot characterize the agency's action as "arbitrary" for failing to consider views
that were never presented to it. Nor can we consider its failure to provide for earlier
public comment arbitrary under these circumstances.
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2. Stellers Listed as Endangered
For the next several years, NMFS continued to reauthorize the fisheries
on an annual basis and to prepare EA/FONSIs on those actions. However,
in March 1997, after issuing the EA/FONSI on the 1997 fishery, NMFS
published a notice of intent to prepare an EIS. On May 5, 1997, NMFS
listed the western population of Steller sea lions as endangered due to
continuing declines in populations."'
3. Greenpeace v. NMFS
In March 1998, NMFS had not yet completed the new EIS and opened
the 1998 fisheries based on an EA/FONSI. A consortium of environmental
groups filed suit, challenging NMFS's compliance with NEPA and the
ESA.' The suit was stayed pending completion of NMFS's ongoing
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) and fishery-wide
biological opinion (1998 fishery-wide BO).9 In addition to the fishery-
wide biological opinion, NMFS planned a separate biological opinion
covering only the pollock and atka mackerel fisheries (1998 pollock and
mackerel BO). In December 1998, NMFS issued (1) the SEIS, (2) the 1998
pollock and mackerel BO, evaluating the impacts of the atka mackerel and
pollock fisheries only, and finding no jeopardy for the atka mackerel
fishery, and jeopardy for the pollock fishery, but recommending an RPA,
i.e., a modification to the action that would allow it to proceed without
causing jeopardy and (3) the 1998 fishery-wide BO, evaluating the
combined effects of the entire groundfish fisheries, but only over the period
of one year, and concluding no jeopardy. NMFS then reinitiated consulta-
tion on fishery-wide impacts to address interactions for the years beyond
1999. The agency planned to replace the 1998 fishery-wide BO with a
more programmatic BO, known as the FMP BiOP, due out later in 2000
(FMP BiOP/BO 2000).
In July 1999, the court ruled on the SEIS and the 1998 pollock and
mackerel BO, holding that NMFS' s SEIS was inadequate in scope, and that
NMFS's pollock and mackerel BO was arbitrary and capricious because it
did not explain how the RPA for the pollock fishery avoided jeopardy. The
court remanded both documents to the agency. It did not rule on the 1998
fishery-wide BO at that time. In October 1999, NMFS submitted a revised
RPA for the pollock fishery along with an analysis explaining how it
89. Threatened Fish and Wildlife, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,345 (May 5, 1997).
90. Greenpeace v. NMFS, No. C98-0492Z (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18,1998).
91. Id.
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avoided jeopardy. The court has never been asked to rule on the adequacy
of the revised pollock RPA.
In January 2000, the court ruled that the 1998 fishery-wide BO,
analyzing the cumulative effects of all the groundfish fisheries for the year
1999, was inadequate in scope. Despite NMFS's assertion that it had
reinitiated consultation, the court reviewed the 1998 BO and concluded that
it was not coextensive in scope with the management regime that governed
the fisheries, and therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the ESA.
Thus, to the extent that the 1998 BO was in place, it was legally inadequate,
and to the extent it had been withdrawn, NMFS had nothing in its place.
The court found NMFS to be in procedural noncompliance with the ESA. 2
On July 20, 2000, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction
prohibiting trawling for groundfish within Steller sea lion critical habitat
and issued an order detailing the prohibitions on August 7, 2000.9,
In considering whether to grant an injunction, the judge noted that the
standards for issuing injunctions under the ESA are different than for non-
ESA cases:
The traditional test for permanent injunctive relief is actual success
on the merits, irreparable injury, and inadequacy of legal remedies
.... This test requires the court to balance any competing claims
of injury and the effect granting or withholding the injunctive relief
would have on the parties and the public interest. [However,]
under the ESA, Congress has foreclosed the exercise of discretion
possessed by a court of equity .... Under the ESA, the balance of
hardships has already been struck in favor of endangered species
... [and] legal remedies are necessarily inadequate. Accordingly,
injunctive relief under the ESA is generally mandated where the
moving party (1) has had or can likely show success on the merits,
and (2) makes the requisite showing of irreparable injury."
The plaintiffs had already won on the merits, so the only issue for the
court to decide was whether there was irreparable injury. The court
analyzed the irreparable injury question under two standards. First, the
court concluded that where a "substantial procedural violation" of the ESA
has occurred, injunctive relief can be appropriate.95 Defendant-intervenors,
a group of commercial fishing interests, argued that the court should issue
an injunction only if necessary to "prevent substantive violations of the
92. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1139 (D. Wash. 2000).
93. Greenpeace v. NMFS, No. C98-492Z, at 1 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7,2000).
94. ld. at 9-10.
95. Id. at I 1 (citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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ESA," as demonstrated by proof of imminent harm to the species." While
disagreeing with the appropriateness of the "imminent harm test," the court
nevertheless analyzed it, and concluded that "[b]ased on the administrative
record alone, the Court concludes continued trawl fishing in sea lion
critical habitat threatens to appreciably diminish the value of critical habitat
as a prey resource for sea lions."97
3. Deference to Agency Science
This second prong of the judge's analysis raises the issue of the degree
of discretion that should be accorded to an agency expert on questions
involving scientific uncertainty. NMFS's expert fishery biologist, Dr.
Andrew Rosenberg, had concluded that:
The TAC [total allowable catch] setting process, specified in the
FMPs is very conservative with respect to the harvest rate by
internationally accepted scientific standards.... Conducting a
fishery in 2000 should not irreversibly or irretrievably alter the
ability of these groundfish species to sustain the proposed harvest
levels. Further, a fishery in 2000 would not alter recruitment rates
for any of the species and it would not alter their ability to
redistribute throughout the area of concern in a way that would
reduce their availability for foraging Steller sea lions. While the
Biological Opinion will examine the TAC setting process, we do
not believe that the 2000 TAC specifications will threaten the
survival and recovery of Steller sea lions nor diminish the value of
designated critical habitat for sea lions.9
Plaintiffs submitted a statement from a different expert, Dr. David
LaVigne, a marine mammal biologist." Dr. LaVigne offered a different
conclusion about the effects of fishing on the dispersion of the fish
populations, stating that "[blecause the North Pacific groundfish fisheries
undisputedly remove large quantities of sea lion prey from areas essential
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 16.
98. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078-79 (W.D. Wash. 2000),
Declaration of Andrew A. Rosenberg, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Administrator for NMFS, p.
4, Feb. 11, 2000. In the North Pacific groundfish fisheries, TAC refers to "total allowable
catch," (i.e., the quota). The term "recruitment rate" refers to the rate at which additional
fish enter the population in question. See WISE, supra note 11, at 170.
99. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1078-79, Declaration of David M.
LaVigne, Ph.D., Mar. 29, 2000 [hereinafter the LaVigne Declaration].
2003]
20 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:1
for sea lion foraging .... the fisheries likely reduce prey availability to the
detriment of sea lions."'" The court concluded that plaintiffs had met the
standards for injunctive relief.
As mentioned in the discussion of APA review, courts generally defer
to agency expertise on issues of scientific uncertainty.' Yet, in this
instance, the court seems to deviate from that jurisprudence, and seems to
imply that there are different standards of deference for evaluating an
agency's completed ESA consultation and its interim determinations of
potential for harm. The court wrote:
[Tihe court takes no position on the ultimate validity of any expert
opinions upon which NMFS may rely in completing the consulta-
tion process, ... for the purposes of this motion ... the plaintiffs'
expert's opinion provides further evidence that continued fishing
in critical habitat threatens to appreciably diminish the value of
critical habitat as a prey resource for sea lions."°2
The court appears to rely on the assertions of the plaintiffs' expert as
evidence in determining that plaintiffs had made the required showing of
harm of the species rather than deferring to agency expertise.
4. Implementation of the Injunction
NMFS implemented the court's injunction by promulgating a rule in
the Federal Register, pursuant to its ESA authority. °3 The judge's ruling
that the agency was out of procedural compliance with the ESA provided
a factual basis for utilizing the ESA's section 1 1(f) authority to implement
regulations necessary to enforce the ESA.
5. Subsequent History
On November 30, 2000, NMFS issued a programmatic biological
opinion, including an RPA that would have seriously constrained fishing
effort in large parts of critical habitat and potentially forced smaller boats
out of business (FMP BiOp/BO 2000). The judge lifted the injunction.
However, several weeks later Congress passed, and the President signed,
100. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 106 F. Supp. at 1079 (quoting LaVigne Declaration).
101. See cases cited, supra note 22. See also the discussion of Fishermen's Dock
Cooperative v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385, infra notes 109-22.
102. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1080.
103. 65 Fed. Reg. 49,766 (Aug. 15, 2000).
Judicial Remedies in Fisheries Litigation
an appropriations rider restricting NMFS's ability to implement the RPA.°"
NMFS opened the 2001 fisheries phasing in parts of RPA as it simulta-
neously reopened consultation and began working with the Council to
develop an alternative protection strategy.' °5
As a result of this process, the Council proposed a revised RPA that re-
opened certain areas of critical habitat to fishing that the original RPA had
closed. Because of the appropriations rider, -the Parties agreed to a
temporary stay in the litigation. During the stay, NMFS issued a biological
opinion assessing the impacts of the revised RPA (2001 BiOp). NMFS
indicated that its November 2000 FMP BiOp still provided the necessary
programmatic review of the fishery's impacts. Plaintiffs challenged the
2001 BiOp alleging that its conclusions were not supported by the
underlying analysis." 6 In a detailed opinion that explored the sufficiency
of the ESA analysis, the court concluded that the conclusions contained in
the Biological Opinion were not supported by the facts in the record and
remanded the analysis to the agency.
B. The Summer Flounder Saga
1. Overview
With a litigation history stretching back to 1993 and spanning two
federal jurisdictions, the summer flounder fishery provides a wealth of
considerations regarding fisheries litigation and remedies. First subjected
to federal management in 1988, the summer flounder fishery has been the
subject of courtroom battles in both the federal district courts of the District
of Columbia and the Eastern District of Virginia, as well as the D.C. Circuit
and Fourth Circuit courts of appeals, resulting in dueling court orders
constraining NMFS's management discretion. We will discuss the three
main lines of summer flounder cases: the Fishermen's Dock cases, the
NRDC cases, and the North Carolina Fishermen's Association cases.
2. Background
Summer flounder migrate up and down the East coast throughout the
year, and whether they are found in State or Federal waters is largely
104. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001C, 114 Stat. 2763, 106 Pub. L. No. 554
(Dec. 21, 2000). See also 146 CONG. REC. S 1185 5 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2000) (Statement of
Sen. Stevens).
105. Steller Sea Lion protection measures, 66 Fed. Reg. 7276 (Jan. 22, 2001).
106. Greenpeace v. NMFS, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1183 (W.D. Wash. 2002).
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influenced by the shape of the continental shelf and the season. In North
Carolina, for example, during the early part of the year, summer flounder
occur predominantly in state waters (i.e., within three miles from shore).
During the later part of the year, they are more abundant farther offshore
in Federal waters. Thus it is necessary for the Atlantic coastal states and
the federal government to coordinate management of summer flounder.
The summer flounder resource has been in an "overfished" status for
years." 7 NMFS first implemented a fishery management plan for summer
flounder in 1988, and has been instituting protective measures designed to
halt overfishing and rebuild the resource ever since. NMFS manages the
fishery in Federal waters pursuant to regulations at 50 C.ER. § 648. These
regulations require that NMFS set an annual coastwide quota, then divide
the quota into allocations for the states. The regulations also require that
if a State exceeds its allocation in one year, that NMFS must deduct the
amount of the "overage" from the following year's quota."
3. The 1993 and 1994 quotas
a. The Fishermen's Dock Cases
This intriguing line of cases features an order from a district court
judge increasing the agency's summer flounder quota by almost three
million pounds, followed by the appeals court's reversal of that order too
late to restore the fish to the fishery. The litigation began in 1993, when a
group of owners and operators of fishing vessels, Fishermen's Dock
Cooperative, brought suit challenging the agency's use of data and exercise
of discretion, within the Magnuson-Stevens Act parameters, in the face of
substantial scientific uncertainty. The first suit was filed in 1993, in the
D.C. District court challenging the 1993 quota. However, the court was
unable to hear the case until December of that year, when the effective
period of the 1993 quota was about to expire. The court found the
challenge moot, dismissed the case without prejudice, and instructed the
plaintiffs that if they brought challenges to later quotas, the same judge,
who was familiar with the facts and issues, would hear the case."°
The following year, those same plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia challenging NMFS's 1994
summer flounder commercial quota." ' That year NMFS had accepted the
107. Summer Flounder Fishery Notice, 55 Fed. Reg. 23,265 (June 7, 1990).
108. 50 C.F.R. § 648. 100(d)(ii) (2003).
109. This history is briefly explained in the 1994 case, Fishermen's Dock Cooperative
v. Brown, 867 F. Supp. 385, 388-89 (E.D. Va. 1994) [hereinafter Fishermen's Dock I].
110. Id. at 386.
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recommendations of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
(Council) in setting the quota. The Council had considered three potential
quota figures based on different estimates of the stock's recruitment rate:
one estimate was based on a geometric mean, one was based on one
standard deviation above the geometric mean, and one was based on a
standard deviation below the geometric mean."' Due to uncertainty about
the stock's recruitment, the Council chose to use the conservative estimate
of recruitment equal to the figure one standard deviation below the
geometric mean rather than equal to the geometric mean. The Council
recommended the quota based on the one standard deviation below the
geometric mean, which would have produced an eighty-one percent
probability of achieving the target fishing mortality goal."'
The district court reviewed this case in light of the Magnuson-Stevens
Act's statutory requirements that management decisions be based on the
best available scientific information, and concluded that the geometric
mean constituted the best available scientific information and that to the
extent the basis for the quota deviated from the mean, it was invalid. The
opinion stated, "the 1994 summer flounder quota is invalid to the extent of
the deviation from the geometric mean....",H The court ordered that the
quota be invalidated to the extent that it was less than the geometric mean,
resulting in an increase in quota from 16.005 million pounds to 19.05
million pounds." 4 This order appears to straddle the line between
invalidating an agency action, and requiring the agency to impose a
judicially determined quota. One way of characterizing which side of the
aisle it falls on, and to what extent it accomplished its goals, is to inquire
what the specific effect of the order was.
NMFS regulations for managing the summer flounder fishery provide
for the agency to set the quota on a calendar year basis, and then, when the
quota is reached, announce closure of the fishery."5 In 1994, the final
specifications were set for the calendar year to achieve the goals of the
FMP. If those quotas were struck down, it seems likely that there would
have been no alternative quotas in place to provide a basis for closing the
fishery upon attainment of the court-ordered quota."6
111. Id. at 388.
112. Id.at388,397.
113. ld. at 397.
114, Fishermen's Dock !, 867 F. Supp. at 397.
115. Management Measures for the Summer Rounder Fisheries, 50 C.F.R. §§ 648.100,
648.101 (2003).
116. Summer Rounder Fishery, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,586 (Mar. 7, 1994).
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b. NMFS's Response
NMFS appealed the district court's decision, but in the interim, agreed
to a consent order requiring the agency to apply the three million pound
increase to the 1995 quota. When publishing the final specifications for
1995, NMFS explained that it had calculated the 1995 quotas in accordance
with the regulations and the Magnuson-Stevens Act requirement to prevent
overfishing, then, pursuant to the court order, had added an additional 3.05
million pounds onto the original quota calculation that would have
prevented overfishing."7 In so doing, NMFS "acknowledg[ed] that the
1995 catch limit may not assure attainment of the target fishing mortality
rate."' . NMFS noted that the FMP did not require any particular level of
probability of achieving the target rate.
c. Appeal
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS's regulations, and the FMP required that
the summer flounder monitoring committee seek a "fairly high level of
confidence that the quota it recommends will not result in [a fishing
mortality greater than the target], even as it must be equally concerned to
provide the fishing industry with an 'optimum yield' both in the current
year and over the long-term."" 9 The court stated that the law does not
require managers to achieve 100 percent certainty, but allows the use of
discretion in selecting a level of certainty that is consistent with "reason-
able assurance." The court went on to recognize the agency's four main
reasons for selecting the more conservative quota: (1) the age structure of
the population magnified the risks; (2) the nature of the recruitment
estimate being used; (3) risks that stock size estimates might be overly
optimistic; and (4) quota restrictions in future years were expected to be
even greater, so it was better to err on the side of conservation in 1994, to
avoid even greater cuts in the future.)" The appellate court wrote:
A quota 'based on' [the best available scientific] information and
designed to 'assure' that the target F was not exceeded while still
providing the fishing industry with an 'optimum yield' could not
properly be determined by a court in judicial review to be, as a
117. Summer Flounder Fishery, 60 Fed. Reg. 8958 (Feb. 16, 1995).
118. Id. at 8959.
119. Fishermen's Dock Cooperative v. Brown, 75 F.3d 164, 169-70 (4th Cir. 1996)
[hereinafter Fishermen's Dock I/]. This case was decided Feb. 2, 1996.
120. Id. at 171.
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matter of law, only one that happened to provide [fifty-nine
percent] chance of not exceeding F. 2
The Fourth Circuit succinctly drives home the point that in reviewing
fishery management measures developed under the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
a district court cannot substitute its judgement for the agency's on issues
of science and policy. The structure of the Magnuson-Stevens Act relies
on agency discretion.' 2
The appeal was not decided until February 1996. Although NMFS won
the appeal, the three million pounds of fish had been taken from the fishery.
The court left it to the agency to determine the next step and, in addressing
the issue of the irreparable consequences to the resource, the Fourth Circuit
wrote:
We recognize, but need not further address, the practical problem
of adjusting the ongoing annual quota-setting process to accommo-
date our decision upholding the Department's 1994 quota [on
February 2, 1996]. The cyclical administrative process of course
has had to continue while this litigation proceeded. The problem
of adjusting it to successive decisions made in judicial review
originated with the district court's decision which, in late 1994,
effectively increased the agency's 1994 quota by three million
pounds. About six weeks later, responding to a show cause order
as to why the court's order had not yet been implemented, the
Department agreed to a consent order to control the matters at issue
pending this appeal. Under that order, the Department was
required to apply to 1995 the three million pound increase
originally ordered for 1994. In its brief to this court, the Depart-
ment indicated that were it to prevail, it would accommodate our
decision in its favor by rescinding the three million pound increase
of the 1995 quota. With 1995 now past, that particular accommo-
dation of course is no longer possible. We need not attempt to
direct just how our invalidation of the judicially-ordered increase
should now be worked into the process. It suffices to reject, as we
121. Id. at 171-72.
122. Id. at 173. On this point, the court further noted the agency's good faith:
Our independent review of the record satisfies us that the agency's
process of setting the 1994 quota was conducted in good faith,
pursued with a proper understanding of the law, based on the best
scientific information available, and adequately justified by the
agency. If there was an inevitable element of arbitrariness in the
decision, it was not the least caprice. Id.
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do, the Coalition's argument that because the consent order was
not appealed by the Secretary, the three million pound increase it
ordered cannot be rescinded.... With that decided, we may leave
to the Department's properly exercised discretion the matter of
how the invalidated increase is to be accommodated in the ongoing
quota-setting process. 3
4. The 1996 and 1997 Quotas
a. The North Carolina Fisheries Association cases
A year after the Fourth Circuit's decision in the Fishermen's Dock
case, a subset of the Fishermen's Dock plaintiffs, the North Carolina
Fishermen's Association, again challenged the agency's summer flounder
quotas, this time challenging NMFS's compliance with the RFA,
Magnuson-Stevens Act's National Standard Eight, and the APA, among
other things.U Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that NMFS's failure to
prepare an IRFA and FRFRA, and failure to adequately consider impacts
on fishing communities, rendered the quotas illegal."
An important aspect of summer flounder management is the way in
which NMFS collects data on the number of fish caught in North Carolina.
In previous years, both NMFS and the state of North Carolina had collected
the same types of data from fish dealers.'23 In 1995 and 1996 NMFS did
not collect the data on its own because it was negotiating to share North
Carolina's data.'" However, in December 1996, North Carolina advised
NMFS that, due to confidentiality constraints, it would not be able to share
the data."
Another key issue was the timing of finalization of North Carolina's
final quotas. On January 4,1996, NMFS published a final rule establishing
the quota for the North Carolina summer flounder fishery. In April 1996,
NMFS published revised quotas for states other than North Carolina
deducting their overages from 1995 from their 1996 quotas. Because of the
issues surrounding data gathering, NMFS did not publish North Carolina's
123. Id.
124. N.C. Fisheries Ass'n v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647 (E.D. Va. 1997) [hereinafter
NC. Fisheries 1]. Recall that in 1996 both the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the
Magnuson-Stevens Act had been amended making old requirements that agencies consider
economic impacts on small entities judicially reviewable, and imposing new requirements
that NMFS consider impacts on fishing communities.
125. Id. at651.
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1995 overages, and consequent deductions from the 1996 quota until
December 10, 1996. A week later, on December 18, 1996, NMFS
published North Carolina's 1997 proposed quota. The final quota for 1997
was published in March 1997.12 However, additional overages were
subtracted, and revisions to the quota made, on July 15, 1997." o When
NMFS published the proposed rule for the 1997 quota, it certified, pursuant
to the RFA, that the proposed quotas would not have a "significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.""'' The basis
of this certification was that "[tihe recommended 1997 quota is no different
from the 1996 coastwide harvest limit....32
On April 4, 1997, plaintiffs, North Carolina Fisheries Association and
Georges Seafood Inc., filed suit, again in the Eastern District of Virginia,
challenging NMFS's setting of the 1997 summer flounder quota for the
state of North Carolina. Among other things, plaintiffs alleged that NMFS
violated the RFA, National Standard Eight of the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
and the APA in failing to prepare an IRFA and FRFA and in failing to
adequately consider impacts on fishing communities. The district court
held that NMFS's "status quo" rationale (i.e., the determination that this
year's quota is the same as last year's quota) did not provide an acceptable
basis for determining whether there is an economic impact. There must be
a showing that the quotas have been examined in light of the current year's
conditions.
b. Remand
As a remedy, the court remanded the quota and ordered the Secretary
to undertake a more thorough analysis of the quota's impacts. The court
also ordered the Secretary to "fix each year's fishing quota including
adjustments, within a reasonable period of time.' 33
During the period of the remand, the agency published the 1998 quota,
and adjusted it twice to account for over harvesting of the 1997 quota. The
original amount of North Carolina's 1998 summer flounder quota was
3,049,589 pounds.' 3 Two deductions, in January and April 1998, reduced
129. Summer Founder Fishery, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,473 (Mar. 7, 1997).
130. Adjustments to the 1997 State Quotas, 62 Fed. Reg. 37,741 (Jul. 15, 1997).
131. Specifications for the 1997 Summer Flounder Fishery, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,648 (Dec.
18, 1996).
132. Id.
133. N. C. Fisheries 1, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 658.
134. Final Specifications for the 1998 Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass
Fisheries, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,304, 66,306 (Dec. 18, 1997).
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that quota by 399,740 pounds as new information came in regarding the
amount of fish that had been harvested in 1997.135
In September 1998, the court reviewed the agency's remanded analysis,
as well as the agency's timeliness in setting a final quota. 3 6 In its
remanded analysis, the agency had again concluded that the 1997 quotas
would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities, and concluded that the requirements of National Standard
Eight had been satisfied. The court found that the remanded analyses were
arbitrary and capricious because they were simply post hoc rationalizations
of the previous decision. In addition, the court concluded that the Secre-
tary's adjustments of the 1998 quota on January 23 and the April 1998
adjustments of the quota violated the court's order to set the final quota
within a reasonable time.1
c. Remedy
In considering the type of remedy to impose, the judge reviewed the
remedial provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the RFA, noting the
availability of remedies such as remand, stay of enforcement, and set-aside
of the agency's action, saying:
The Court has considerable latitude to fashion an appropriate
remedy in this action. The Regulatory Flexibility Act expressly
authorizes "corrective action" "including but not limited to-(A)
remanding the rule to the agency, and (B) deferring the enforce-
ment of the rule against small entities unless the court finds that
continued enforcement of the rule is in the public interest." See 5
U.S.C. § 61 1(a)(4). The Magnuson-Stevens Act expressly
authorizes a court to "set aside" a regulation or agency action ....
In the present case, the Secretary has acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in failing to make a good faith attempt at conducting an
Economic Analysis as mandated under the RFA and the Magnuson
Act.
38
After this discussion of the types of remedies generally contemplated, the
court ordered that the 1997 summer flounder quota be set aside by the
amount of the 1997 over harvests. The court described its remedy as a
"sanction" against the agency:
135. See Adjustments to the 1998 Quotas, 63 Fed. Reg. 3478 (Jan. 23, 1998);
Readjustments to 1998 Quotas, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,227 (Apr. 28, 1998).
136. N. C. Fisheries I1, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 652.
137. Id. at 657.
138. Id.
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The Court sanctions the Secretary and sets aside the 1997 commer-
cial flounder quota by 399,740 pounds as arbitrary and capricious.
In imposing this sanction, the Court notes that as a corrective
measure, it could have sanctioned the Secretary by up to 762,397.2
pounds without impacting the Secretary's regulations concerning
a stock assessment goal of F=.23 for 1997. Yet for the time being,
the Court only will set aside 399,740 pounds as a sanction, the total
amount of which represents the penalty adjustment that the
Secretary applied for 1997 overages. . . . [Further,] the Court
ORDERS the Secretary and his subordinates not to utilize that
figure as "overfishing" for any subsequent years in setting a
summer flounder quota.... In that respect, the Court retains
jurisdiction of these proceedings and may revisit the entire matter
for purposes of enforcement of its prior orders. 139
From an administrative law perspective, this order could be interpreted as
an order to strike down or enjoin enforcement of the agency action's final
rule implementing the 399,740 pound deduction. Yet, it is not clear how
the order preventing the Secretary from ever accounting for the 399,740
pounds fits that interpretation. On the other hand, the order could be
construed as the court's striking down of the agency's quota and determina-
tion of OY, and replacing them with a new, specific quota of its own, new
practical results regarding OY, and accounting for the fish harvested. The
practical result for the fishery was that the court order increased the 1997
quota by 399,740 pounds."4
5. The 1999 Quota
Meanwhile, back in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, a new wave of litigation was brewing to challenge NMFS's selection
of "probabilities..' 4 On December 31, 1998, NMFS published the summer
flounder quota for 1999.42 The quota had an eighteen percent probability
139. Id. at 668-69.
140. Id.
141. See NRDC v. Daley, 62 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 1999) [hereinafter NRDC v. Daley
1]. Recall, NMFS's 1995 statement when modifying the 1995 quota pursuant to the court's
order, that the FMP did not require a specific probability of achieving the target. In 1996,
the Sustainable Fisheries Act amended the Magnuson-Stevens Act and incorporated
rebuilding requirements into the statute. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297,
110 Stat. 1996.
142. Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass Fisheries, 63 Fed. Reg. 72,203,
72,204 (Dec. 31, 1998).
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of achieving the target fishing mortality rate (F) that would prevent
overfishing. NMFS selected the quota as a compromise between the
summer flounder monitoring committee's recommendations, which would
have had a fifty percent probability of preventing overfishing, and the Mid-
Atlantic Fishery Management Council's recommendation, which would
have had a three percent probability of preventing overfishing. Plaintiffs
challenged that the quota violated the Magnuson-Stevens Act requirement
to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished fisheries.'4 3 The lower court
ruled that the Magnuson-Stevens Act required a balancing of competing
policy objectives including National Standard Eight's requirement to
provide for sustained participation of fishing communities, and National
Standard One's mandate to achieve OY, prevent overfishing, and rebuild
overfished fisheries, and that NMFS's decision was reasonable in light of
the Chevron standard of deference.1" Also, the court was sensitive to the
practical problems of reviewing a quota much of which had already been
harvested:
[TIhe parties agreed at the Motions Hearing on July 21, 1999, that
the 1999 summer flounder fishing season has already proceeded
more than half way to completion. As a practical matter, Plain-
tiffs' prayer for relief to revise the 1999 ... quota cannot be
implemented, given the fact that the.., quota has already been in
place for some time. As a consequence, although not a dispositive
factor, this Court questions the feasibility of implementing a new
.. quota at this juncture.145
Because Plaintiffs failed to show that NMFS's actions were arbitrary and
capricious, the lower court ruled in favor of the government.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found that Congress had not left complete
discretion to balance National Standards Eight and One to the agency.
Rather, the Magnuson-Stevens Act makes the requirements of National
Standard One an absolute obligation, while the substantive requirements of
National Standard Eight apply only when comparing management
alternatives that satisfy the conservation goals of National Standard One.'4
The Government concedes, and we agree, that under the Fishery
Act, the Service must give priority to conservation measures. It is
143. NRDC v. Daley 1, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 102.
144. Id. at 109.
145. Id. at 108.
146. NRDC v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747,753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter NRDC v. Daley1t1.
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only when two different plans achieve similar conservation
measures that the Service takes into consideration adverse
economic consequences. 1
4 7
The Daley II court, taking note of the Fisherman's Dock case, stated that
NMFS must have a "fairly high level of confidence that the quota it
recommends will not result in [exceeding the target fishing mortality
rate].'' 48 Ultimately, the court held that a quota with an eighteen percent
chance of meeting mandatory conservation goals was arbitrary and
capricious. The court wrote:
The disputed 1999 TAL had at most an [eighteen percent] likeli-
hood of achieving the target F. Viewed differently, it had at least
an [eighty-two percent] chance of resulting in an F greater than the
target F. Only in Superman Comics' Bizarro world, where reality
is turned upside down, could the Service reasonably conclude that
a measure that is at least four times as likely to fail as is to succeed
offers a "fairly high level of confidence."' 49
a Remedy
On April 25, 2000, the court concluded that the statute and regulations
require at least fifty percent probability of achieving the target F and
remanded the quota to the agency "for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion."'" At that point, the 1999 quota had been fully harvested.
6. The 2000 Quota
In January 2000, prior to the D.C. Circuit rendering its opinion in
NRDC v. Daley II, NMFS had published a proposed rule to set the 2000
summer flounder specifications. 5 ' Before NMFS could issue the final rule,
the D.C. Circuit ruled that summer flounder specifications must have at
least a fifty percent probability of achieving their target rates. 52 On May
24, 2000, NMFS published the final rule to implement the specifications
noting that additional work needed to be done to assure the fifty percent
probability, but asserting that it was better to implement some level of
147. Id. at 753.
148. Id. at 754 (quoting Fishermen's Dock 11, 75 F.3d at 169-70).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 756.
151. 2000 Specifications, 65 Fed. Reg. 4547 (Jan. 28,2000).
152. NRDC v. Daley 11, 209 F.3d at 756.
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control in the interim."5 3 NFS stated its intention to promulgate final
measures complying with the D.C. Circuit's order by August 1, 2000. " In
the final rule, NMFS also noted that any quota overages in the 2000
commercial summer flounder fishery would be deducted from 2001 quotas,
as provided under the FMP. '55
On June 23, 2000, NRDC filed suit alleging that the 2000 quotas did
not prevent overfishing and failed to account for excess fishing mortality
that occurred in 1999.'56 NRDC alleged that NMFS's failure to account for
fishing mortality from 1999 skewed the probability of the 2000 quota's
success to a level below fifty percent. 57 In November, 2000, NMFS and
NRDC entered a settlement agreement pursuant to which NMFS agreed to
revise the summer flounder quota in 2001 so that it would achieve the
biomass that would have been achieved had the 1999, 2000, and 2001
quotas all been set to have a fifty percent probability of hitting the target
fishing mortality rate (Biomass target).55 The agreement also explicitly
addressed the issue of deducting overages, providing: "[niothing in this
agreement excuses Defendant's responsibility pursuant to 50 C.F.R.
648. 100(d)(2) to deduct overages from the 2001 TAL."'5 0
7. The 2001 Quota
In December 2000, NMFS was struggling to finalize the counts of fish
harvested and set the next year's final quota in a reasonable time and to
comply with orders in two competing law suits when an additional
complication arose. The Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission
(ASMFC), the coalition of state management agencies that share responsi-
bility for the summer flounder fishery in state waters, announced that it
would set the state quotas higher than the proposed Federal quota. NMFS
delayed publishing a final quota while it worked to coordinate summer
flounder management with the ASMFC.
While NMFS and the ASMFC discussed how best to resolve the
inconsistency, in March 2001, North Carolina Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. sued to
enforce the court's order that NMFS publish the final quota in a reasonable
153. 2000 Specifications, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,486 (May 24,2000).
154. Id. at 33,487.
155. Id.




159. Id. at 4.
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time."W By this time, NMFS was under court order from the NRDC v.
Daley II case to ensure that the Federal quota would achieve a fifty percent
probability of achieving the rebuilding target.161 Failure to deduct overages
from the previous year could have had adverse effects on the ability to
achieve that target. The court in the Eastern District of Virginia did not
rule on the March motion until July 30, 2001. By that time, NMFS had
published the final unadjusted quota (which did take into account some of
the overages) on March 23, 2001. When the court did rule, it concluded
that NMFS had violated the order to set the final quota in a reasonable and
timely manner, and that sanctions were appropriate. 62
a Remedy
As a sanction, the court ordered the Secretary "not to make any
additional adjustments to North Carolina's summer flounder quota in 2001
or any year thereafter on the basis of any additional overages that are
discovered from North Carolina's 2000 summer flounder quota."'" This
remedy could be viewed as the imposition of a new and different quota
from the one selected by the Secretary. On the other hand, it could be
viewed as an injunction prohibiting future agency action. In any event, the
practical effect may have been to further challenge the agency's ability to
achieve the Biomass target mandated by the D.C. Circuit's order.
C. The Hawaii Longline Fishery
1. Background
In the Western Pacific, NMFS manages several fisheries including the
pelagic longline fishery for tuna and swordfish. Endangered sea turtles-
leatherback, olive ridley, and loggerhead-migrate through the waters
surrounding Hawaii in which the longline fishing occurs. Over the years,
NMFS completed a series of ESA consultations on the fishery's effects on
the turtles with varying conclusions. NMFS also prepared a series of
environmental assessments on the fishery, and a single environmental
impact statement on the action to implement a limited entry program in the
160. N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Evans, 152 F. Supp. 2d 870, 870 (E.D. Va. 2001).
161. NRDC v. Daley 1I, supra note 146, at 749.
162. N.C. Fisheries Ass'n, 152 F. Supp. 2d at 882-83. The court stated that NMFS's
efforts to coordinate with the ASMFC did not excuse the agency from setting a final quota
in a timely manner. The court further concluded that his orders did not conflict with the
D.C. Circuit's (NRDC v. Daley I1) order that management measures achieve a fifty percent
probability of achieving the Biomass target. Id. at 880.
163. Id. at 882.
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fishery in 1993, but no environmental impact statement on the fishery as a
whole.
The conclusions of the ESA consultations consistently highlighted the
need for more information. In the first consultation, completed in 1985,
NMFS concluded that the fishery was not likely to jeopardize the turtles.'
In 1991, the agency completed another consultation on the fishery, again
concluding no jeopardy, but noting that limited information was available
and requiring fishery participants to submit logbooks.' 65 In 1993, NMFS
issued a new biological opinion (BO) incorporating new information
received through the log books. The 1993 BO concluded that the fishery
was adversely affecting the turtles but was not likely to jeopardize their
continued existence over the next twelve months.'I The 1993 BO stated
that current levels of turtle takes could not be sustained over the long-term
without causing jeopardy. 67  The agency implemented an observer
program.'" In 1994, NMFS issued another BO increasing the number of
authorized turtle takes based on information from logbooks and the
observer program. 69 In 1998, NMFS issued a new BO concluding that the
fishery's operations from 1998-2001 would not jeopardize sea turtles. 7 °
In 1999, two environmental organizations, the Center for Marine
Conservation and the Turtle Island Restoration Network, challenged
NMFS's conclusions under the ESA as being based on assumptions
contrary to the record or without a basis.' 7 ' In addition, they claimed that
NMFS's authorization of the fishery did not comply with NEPA.' 2
Plaintiffs claimed that NMFS should have prepared an EIS before issuing
the 1998 BO. The court upheld the agency's ESA conclusions of no
jeopardy based on the fact that the agency was using the best available
scientific information. 73
164. Leatherback Sea Turtle v. NMFS, No. 99-152 DAE, 1999 WL 33594329, at *2 (D.
Haw. Oct. 18, 1999) (Order granting summary judgment).




169. Leatherback Sea Turtle, 1999 WL 33594329, at *3.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id. On August 26, 1999, the day before the complaint was filed, NMFS decided
to prepare an EIS on the longline fishery, and planned to complete it by October 1, 2001.
NMFS also decided to prepare an EA on the operation of the fishery during the period the
EIS was being developed. In addition, NMFS implemented several precautionary measures
to reduce turtle hooking mortality.173. Id. at "9-* 11.
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However, the court concluded that the incidental take statement (ITS)
included in the 1998 BO constituted a "permit" that required NEPA
compliance pursuant to Ramsey v. Kantor. 4 The last NEPA analysis the
agency had prepared was in 1993 and was focused on an amendment to the
FMP rather than on an ITS. The court found that NMFS had violated
NEPA by not preparing an EA on the 1998 ITS:
Defendants failed to thoroughly evaluate the environmental impact
of the authorized incidental takes and because of this, the harm to




In considering what remedy to order for the NEPA violation, the judge
considered jurisprudence on the issuance of injunctions. He concluded that
injunctive relief is appropriate for NEPA violations, and that remedies for
violations of NEPA should be carefully tailored to balance environmental
concerns of NEPA with broader societal interests.
76
As a remedy, the judge issued a court order, which he subsequently
modified four times, establishing closed areas, gear requirements, and other
management requirements for the Hawaii longline fishery. His goal
appears to have been to carefully tailor a remedy that would provide
174. Leatherback Sea Turtle, 1999 WL 33594329, at *15 (citing Ramsey v. Kantor, 96
F.3d 434, 444 (9th Cir. 1996)).
175. ld. at *16.
176. See id. at *17 (citing Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984),
Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1984), Save Our Ecosystems v. Clark,
747 F.2d 1240 (9th Cir. 1984), Alpine Lakes Protection Soc'y v. Schlapfer, 518 F.2d 1089
(9th Cir. 1975), American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F. 2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983); citing
Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F. 2d 983 (5th Cir. 1981), Western Oil and Gas
Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978), and Conservation Soc'y of Southern Vermont v.
Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 921 (2nd Cir. 1974).
While these cases do support the premise that injunctive relief can be appropriate, none
of them deals with a comparable situation in which the "injunction" so specifically affects
agency discretion and management. The case most relevant to the point that judges are free
to craft relief short of full-blown estoppel of an ongoing or proposed action is Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a district court opinion that an
injunction to stop the unpermitted discharge of ordinance into the waters surrounding Puerto
Rico was not necessary since less restrictive relief, in the form of an order to obtain a permit,
was available. 456 U.S. 305 (1982). Yet even the relief in that case arose from a specific,
nondiscretionary statutory obligation that already existed within the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA). that an agency must obtain a permit. That relief is distinguishable
from this case in which the judge designs and orders a specific regulatory regime to be
imposed. As demonstrated by the number of modifications to the order, the remedy the
judge granted does not appear to be a specific, nondiscretionary statutory obligation.
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interlocutory protection to turtles while minimizing to the extent possible
harm to the fishery. He wrote,
Here, because of the public interest in the Fishery, an injunction,
as framed by Plaintiffs, which stops all activities of the Fishery
pending completion of an EIS, cannot bejustified as an appropriate
remedy under the circumstances of this case. However, a carefully
tailored injunction during the EIS period is warranted. Given the
complexity of this case, the court has given the parties an opportu-
nity to input their suggestions on the terms of the injunction. "
Although the court could have enforced its injunction against parties to the
lawsuit through contempt of court powers, it appeared that the judge
intended the agency to implement the injunction through rulemaking.
However, because the judge had found the agency to be in compliance with
the ESA, there was no necessity for the agency to further enforce the ESA,
and consequently no basis for promulgating a rule under section 11 (f) of
the ESA.
b. Implementation
NMFS elected to use its regulatory authority under section 305(c) of
the Magnuson-Stevens Act based on a finding that an emergency existed,
and on December 27, 1999, promulgated a rule implementing the closed
area and management measures ordered by the U.S. District Court for the
District of Hawaii. 17 On June 19, 2000, NMFS published an extension of
the emergency rule managing the fishery pursuant to the court's order, and
explained that the basis for the rule was to "reduce adverse impacts to sea
turtles by restricting the activities of the Hawaiian long-line fishery."'79
Language in the extension further explained that, "[e]xtension of the
emergency rule will maintain the temporary area closure until December
177 Leatherback Sea Turtle, 1999 WL 33594329, at *18.
178. Hawaii-based Pelagic Longline AreaClosure, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,290 (Dec. 27, 1999).
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, if the Secretary finds that an emergency exists, he may
promulgate emergency regulations not to exceed 180 days in duration. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(c)
(2003). The Magnuson-Stevens Act further states that any FMP, and any regulation
promulgated to implement such plan, shall be consistent with the National Standards. Id.
§ 185 1(a). Any emergency regulation which changes an existing FMP shall be treated as an
amendment to the FMP. Id. § 1855(c)(3). Thus, emergency rules that modify existing FMPs
must be consistent with the National Standards and the section 303(a) requirements.
179. Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific, 65 Fed. Reg. 37,917
(June 19, 2000).
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23, 2000, or until new time and area closures, as imposed by the court, are
implemented by NMFS."'' "
Through several additional rules published in the Federal Register,
NMFS implemented a series of increasingly complex management
requirements reflecting modified court orders that culminated in an
elaborate, judicially imposed regime.""1 The specific requirements of the
final scenario included:
(1) No vessel registered for use with a Hawaii longline limited
access permit (Hawaii longline vessel) may use longline fishing
gear to target swordfish north of the equator. Longline gear must
always be deployed such that the deepest point of the main
longline between any two floats, i.e., the deepest point in each sag
of the main line, is at a depth greater than 100 m (328.1 ft or 54.6
fin) below the sea surface. (2) No Hawaii longline vessel may fish
with longline gear from April 1, 2001, through May 31, 2001, in
the area bounded on the south by the equator, on west by 180
[degrees] W. long., on the east by 145 [degrees] W. long., and on
the the north by 15 [degrees] N. lat. (3) A Hawaii longline vessel
that is de-registered from a Hawaii longline limited access permit
after March 29, 2001, may not be registered again with a Hawaii
longline limited access permit, except during the month of
October. (4) If a sea turtle is discovered hooked or entangled on a
longline during gear retrieval, retrieval shall cease until the turtle
has been removed from the gear or brought onto the vessel's deck.
(5) Hooks must be removed from the sea turtles as quickly and
carefully as possible. If a hook cannot be removed, the line must
be cut as close to the hook as possible. (6) Wire or bolt cutters
capable of cutting through a longline hook must be on board each
vessel to facilitate cutting of hooks imbedded in sea turtles. (7)
The vessel operator shall bring comatose sea turtles on board the
vessel and perform resuscitation as prescribed in 50 C.F.R.
223.206(d)(1). The Order shall remain in effect until further order
of the Court.182
180. id. (emphasis added).
181. See Fisheries off West Coast States and the Western Pacific, 65 Fed. Reg. 49,968
(Aug. 16,2000) (notice); Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific, 65 Fed.
Reg. 51,992 (Aug. 25, 2000) (final rule).
182. Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,134
(Apr. 19,2001).
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In sum, the orders closed a large portion of the Pacific ocean to longlining.
The fishery is still subject to the court's injunction pending filing of a final
rule to implement the agency's new management scheme. The new
management regime about to be implemented is based on recommendations
from a three person panel consisting of one appointee from the plaintiffs,
one from the agency, and one from the Defendant Intervenors. Other
interested members of the public did not have the same opportunity to
participate as the litigants.
The agency's lack of discretion and reliance on the court order to
provide the legal basis for these rules raise questions about how the
Magnuson-Stevens Act's national standards are being evaluated. When
courts get into the level of detail that this one did, and the agency uses
Magnuson-Stevens Act powers to implement court-ordered management
measures, the result can be less public involvement and frustration of the
intent of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
D. Monk Seals and Crustaceans
1. Background
In addition to the pelagic longline fishery, NMFS manages two other
federal fisheries in the Western Pacific: the crustacean (lobster) fishery,
and the bottomfish fishery, both of which occur in areas inhabited by
endangered monk seals. In January 2000, environmental groups sued
NMFS alleging violations of NEPA and sections 7 and 9 of the ESA, with
respect to the agency's management of the crustacean fishery, and
violations of NEPA and section 9 of the ESA with respect to the bottomfish
fishery." Specific facts regarding each fishery are provided below.
2. Lobster
In 1983, NMFS implemented the FMP for the Crustacean Fisheries of
the Western Pacific Region. This FMP governs fishing for lobsters in the
waters around Hawaii. In conjunction with implementation of the FMP,
NMFS prepared an EIS on the fishery in 1983. Monk seals, an endangered
species, also inhabit the Hawaiian islands and are known to consume
lobster. In conjunction with implementation of the FMP, NMFS completed
an ESA consultation in 1981 noting a paucity of information available on
183. Greenpeace Found. v. Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Haw. 2000); Greenpeace
Found. v. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (D. Haw. 2000).
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the monk seals' food supply.'8 The BO stated that based on the available
data, monk seals were opportunistic feeders, and if there were a scarcity of
lobsters, they would probably be able to switch to other prey. The BO also
stated:
[T]here is insufficient information available... to be able to insure
that the proposed activity will not jeopardize the continued
existence of the monk seal [because] the predator-prey relationship
of monk seals and spiny lobster is poorly understood and there is
essentially no information available on the importance of spiny
lobster in the monk seal diet. 185
In addition the BO noted that it "should not be construed as a 'no jeopardy
opinion,"' but it nevertheless recommended approval of the FMP. ' NMFS
implemented the FM."P".
Subsequently, in 1996, NMFS prepared another BO in conjunction with
a new harvest strategy.'88 The BO concluded that competition with the
lobster fishery for prey had been identified as a factor in the continuing
decline of the monk seals. However, it concluded that given the healthy
status of the lobster stocks, and the relatively small fishing effort expected
to occur in key areas, the FMP, as amended, was not likely to jeopardize
the monk seals."8 9 In 1999, based on the availability of new information on
monk seals, NMFS reinitiated consultation, and concluded that the 1999
harvest levels were not likely tojeopardize the continued existence of monk
seals. 190
3. Bottomfish
NMFS prepared a BO on the bottomfish fishery in 1986, and another
in 1991. The BO' s acknowledged previous interactions between the fishery
and monk seals, such as hookings. NMFS concluded that the level of
harmful interactions was probably not a significant concern, but planned a
program of education for fishermen and implemented requirements for
observer coverage. With respect to NEPA, NMFS had prepared an EIS on
the lobster fishery in 1986, but had not prepared an EIS on the bottomfish





189. Greenpeace Found v. Daley, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1118.
190. Id. at 1118-19.
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fishery. At the time of litigation, the agency had begun preparing EISs for
both fisheries.
4. The Court's Conclusions
a Lobster
The court concluded that with respect to the lobster fishery, NMFS had
not complied with section 7 of the ESA because it had not taken into
account the best available data, and consultation must be reinitiated; there
was not sufficient data to prove that the lobster fishery was taking monk
seals through competition for prey in violation of section 9; an EIS was
required under NEPA to evaluate fishery interactions with monk seals; and
NMFS had failed to meet this requirement.' 9'
b. Bottomfish
With respect to the ESA, the court concluded that NMFS had not
complied with the requirements of section 7 of the ESA. The court noted
that "NMFS cannot speculate that no jeopardy to monk seals or adverse
modification of their habitat will occur because it lacks enough information
regarding the impact of the fishery on [the monk] seals."'" The court
stressed that the agency's duty was a "rigorous," "affirmative" duty to
"insure" that the FMP does not jeopardize the monk seals, and found that
the agency had not met this requirement.93 With respect to section 9, the
court found that there was evidence in the record showing that "monk seals
have been killed, hooked, and poisoned in connection with the bottomfish
fishery," in the past. 94 However, the court could not make a preliminary
ruling that the fishery was continuing to take monk seals in violation of
section 9 of the ESA. 9' Such a determination depended upon facts not
available in the record. However, the court expected that NEPA and ESA
section 7 analyses would produce the necessary information."
5. Remedy
In terms of relief, the court enjoined the lobster fishery pending
completion of a new BO and EIS. The order read, "[diefendants are
191. Id. at 1117-22.
192. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2dat 1133.
193. Id. at 1131.
194. Id. at 1136.
195. Id. at 1134.
196. Id. at 1135.
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enjoined from implementing the Crustacean FMP until the Court receives
notice that both the Biological Opinion and the EIS ... are complete and
have been issued. Accordingly, the lobster fishery is to remain inactive
until such time."'" However, noting that some of the potentially affected
parties were not represented in the case, the court refrained from enjoining
the bottomfish fishery pending a hearing to gather evidence on whether
harm was still occurring and on the impacts on the fishermen in order to do
a balancing of the harms.' Subsequently, the court conducted an
evidentiary hearing and determined that an injunction was not justified for
the bottomfish fishery.
6. NMFS's Implementation of the Crustacean Closure
During the court's consideration of this case and through the time the
court issued its injunction on November 15, 2000, NMFS had already
closed the lobster fishery pursuant to the FMP due to NMFS's scientific
concern about the health of the lobster resource and to prevent
overfishing. 99 Under the FMP's default provisions, the lobster fishery is
closed from January through June each year. In 2000, due to concerns
about the potential for overfishing, NMFS closed the fishery from July
through December as well. In February 2001, following the court's order,
NMFS issued a notice that pursuant to the court order and other consider-
ations, there would be zero allowable landings of lobster in 2001. A unique
aspect of the crustacean FMP is that it provides regulatory authority for
instituting emergency response measures to address harm to monk seals."
Although NMFS did not purport to announce the zero harvest level in
accordance with these procedures, an argument exists that the judge's
remedy was within the agency's power to implement regulatorily. On the
other hand, the judge's phrasing of the injunction, so that it prohibited
NMFS from implementing the FMP, arguably rendered the crustacean
fishery open access. If read literally, it actually prohibited NMFS from
maintaining the closures already on the books.
197. Mineta, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 1140.
198. Id. at 1139. The judge wrote: "[the Court is concerned that participants in the
bottomfish fishery ... are unrepresented in this suit. Although it is a safe assumption that
those active in the fishery (if represented) would join NMFS in opposing an injunction, the
Court cannot assume that they share identical interests with NMFS." Id.
199. Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific, 65 Fed. Reg. 39,314
(June 26, 2000).
200. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 660.51, 660.52 (2003).
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E. The Sharks' Story
NMFS regulates fishing for sharks off the coast of the eastern United
States pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Because sharks are
considered "highly migratory species," the Secretary, rather than any of the
fishery management councils, has primary regulatory authority over the
Atlantic shark fisheries." In 1993, after determining that shark popula-
tions were overfished, NMFS implemented an FMP to regulate the shark
fishery. As the agency managed the species in the face of significant
scientific uncertainty, controversy brewed about whether the agency's
quotas were too conservative or too liberal, and ultimately led to litigation.
The 1993 shark FMP established a permitting system and set commer-
cial quotas and recreational bag limits for three groups of sharks: large
coastal sharks (LCS), small coastal sharks (SCS), and pelagic sharks. 2 In
1996, the two advisory bodies charged with recommending management
measures could not agree on how to manage the shark fishery; one could
not even reach internal agreement. In October 1996, an environmental
group, the Biodiversity Legal Foundation (BLF) filed a petition for
rulemaking requesting that NMFS cut the 1997 shark quotas by fifty
percent and reduce the recreational bag limits as well.3 This request
reflected recommendations from one of the two advisory committees that,
in light of risk to the species, a cut be made for precautionary purposes. In
December 1996, NMFS proposed a rule to implement the reductions and
stated that the proposal was based on the best available scientific informa-
tion.'
With its proposed rule, NMFS published a certification pursuant to the
RFA, stating that the proposed quota cuts would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The basis for
this conclusion was NMFS' s estimate that directed shark fishermen earn at
most $26,426 per year from the directed shark fishery and supplement their
income from other sources. During the public comment period, NMFS
received comments from commercial shark fishermen who disagreed with
the certification and asserted their economic dependence on the fishery. At
the final rule stage, NMFS supplemented its certification with additional
analysis, but maintained the conclusion that the reductions would not result
201. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a)(3), 1854(g) (2003).
202. Fishery Conservation and Management, 58 Fed. Reg. 21,931 (Apr. 26, 1993).
203. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. 1411, 1423 (M.D. Fla.
1998) [hereinafter SOFA 1].
204. Atlantic Shark Fisheries, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,295 (Dec. 20, 1996).
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in a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.'
Plaintiffs, a coalition of shark fishermen and fishing organizations,
challenged the scientific basis for the reductions under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act and challenged the agency's failure to prepare a full-blown
analysis, as required by the RFA for rules that cannot be "certified" as
having no "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities."' On July 16, 1997, BLF, which had petitioned for the rule in the
first place, in conjunction with other environmental organizations, moved
to intervene.2 The court "denied as untimely the proposed intervenors'
motion on August 22, 1997," but allowed them to file amicus briefs.'
In a decision issued February 28, 1998, the court upheld the agency's
actions on a variety of APA and Magnuson-Stevens Act challenges, noting
that:
The administrative record before the court evinces a healthy debate
(both within NMFS and between NMFS and participating constitu-
encies) which featured noticeably vocal expert opinions both
supporting and opposing the means employed by the Secretary. It
is the prerogative of [the Secretary] to weigh those opinions and
make a policy judgment based on the scientific data.'
However, the court concluded that the agency's determinations under the




The court remanded the RFA determinations to the agency with
instructions to "undertake a rational consideration of the economic effects
and potential alternatives to the 1997 quotas.' '21' The court also upheld the
agency's new quotas during the period of remand, writing: "[c]onsidering
the delicate status of the Atlantic sharks, . .. the public interest requires
205. Atlantic Shark Fisheries, 62 Fed. Reg. 16,648 (Apr. 7, 1997).
206. SOFA 1, 995 F. Supp. at 1434.
207. Id. at 1424.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1432-33 (quoting Organized Fishermen of Florida v. Franklin, 846 F. Supp.
1569, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1994)).
210. SOFA 1, 995 F. Supp. at 1437.
211. Id. at 1436.
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maintenance of the 1997 Atlantic shark quotas pending remand and until
further order of the court."212
2. Rebuilding Plan
Upon implementation of the FMP in 1993, NMFS had determined
Atlantic sharks to be "overfished." After the SFA amendments of 1996, the
"overfished" status triggered substantive new requirements that FMPs
rebuild overfished fisheries to sustainable levels. When NMFS included
Atlantic sharks on a list of overfished fisheries in 1997, a statutory one-year
deadline went into effect for developing a rebuilding plan. NMFS began
developing the required rebuilding plan during the period of the Southern
Offshore Fishing Ass'n (SOFA) litigation. 213
On May 15, 1998, NMFS submitted its remanded economic impact
analysis to the court. The remanded analysis concluded that the action may
have had a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities .2" The court appointed a special master to review the document
and analyze the availability of workable alternatives to the restrictive
quotas.215 At this point, there were a series of joint requests for stays in the
litigation and in the special master proceedings pending settlement
discussions.2 6 The court issued a series of three orders staying the
litigation.2 7 In each of these orders, the court included language that
existing (1997) quotas would remain in effect during the stay. The final
stay concluded on June 21, 1999.
On May 28, 1999, at the culmination of a long and public process, the
agency published a final rule to implement a rebuilding plan for the Highly
Migratory Species (HMS) fisheries (including Atlantic sharks), to be
effective on July 1, 1999, over a week after the judge's final stay order
212. Id.
213. NMFS noted in its final rule implementing the 1997 quotas that the quotas were just
an interim step and NMFS intended to update its scientific information and implement a
long-term rebuilding plan. 62 Fed. Reg. 16,648 (Apr. 7, 1997). See also NMFS's notice of
intent to prepare EISs and develop rebuilding plans, Atlantic Shark Fisheries, 62 Fed. Reg.
45,614 (Aug. 28 1997); NMFS's notice of availability of draft FMP containing rebuilding
plans, Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,093 (Oct. 26, 1998); NMFS's
proposed and final rules to implement the FMP, Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, 64 Fed.
Reg. 3154 (Jan. 20, 1999); and Atlantic Highly Migratory Species, 64 Fed. Reg. 29,090
(May 28, 1999).
214. Southern Offshore Fishing Ass'n v. Daley, 55 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (M.D. Fla. 1999)
[hereinafter SOFA II].
215. Id. at 1340. The special master was appointed on October 17, 1998. Id.
216. Id. at 1342.
217. Id
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would expire.2"8 The rebuilding plan included strict cuts in quotas for
sharks. The agency notified the court of the final rule on June 3, 1999.
The plaintiffs added a challenge to the new 1999 quotas to the case that was
still pending before the court.219
On June 30, 1999, the judge issued an opinion (1) agreeing with the
agency's conclusion that the 1997 quotas may have had a significant
economic impact on small entities, (2) but criticizing the agency's
analytical approach and indicating that the agency had not sufficiently
considered potential alternatives that would have minimized economic
impacts, and (3) holding that the new 1999 quotas contained in the
rebuilding plan violated his original 1998 order that the court would
maintain the 1997 quotas pending further consideration.2' The specific
fault the judge found with the analytical approach was that the agency erred
by considering the impacts of the quotas on all permit holders, three-fourths
of whom had not recently used their permits or who caught only small
amounts of shark.22" ' The judge concluded that this approach diluted the
analysis of impacts on a smaller group of high-level participants in the
commercial shark fishery.2" While not directly invalidating the remand
analysis which was still under consideration by the special master, the
judge commented that the remanded analysis seemed to be "clearly
skewed," and "arbitrary and capricious," despite his agreement with its
conclusion. Although the judge ordered that the remand to the special
master continue to proceed, he harshly criticized the agency for violating
his 1998 order, writing:
I reluctantly conclude that in this instance NMFS is an agency
willing to pursue its institutional objectives without acknowledging
applicable Congressional and judicial limitations.... Although
the preservation of the Atlantic shark species is a benevolent,
laudatory goal, conservation does not justify government lawless-
ness.
223
218. See supra note 213.
219. SOFA 11, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1343.
220. Id. at 1345-46.
221. Id. at 1339.
222. Id. at 1339-40.
223. Id. at 1345.
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3. Remedy
In considering the remedy, the judge considered both the biological and
the economic risks. Regarding the health of the shark stock, he appeared
to disagree with the agency's conclusions about the level of fishing the
stocks could sustain. He wrote:
Considering the short duration of the commercial shark-
fishing season (two to three weeks, twice a year), the injunc-
tion imposed by this order (expected, if the defendant is
diligent, to last a zoologically inconsequential duration)
should have no significant impact on the defendant's long-
term goal of rebuilding shark stocks to ideal levels....'
Of the potential economic consequences, he noted that the plaintiffs, who
had successfully challenged NMFS' s "draconian and probably confiscatory
limits," have "reaped no reward and enjoyed no relief."225 He decided to
enjoin NMFS from enforcing the 1999 regulations for Atlantic shark to the
extent that they differed from the 1997 measures, and he ordered that the
1997 measures remain in place to preserve the status quo "pending further
judicial review."22  Although this order raised a potential biological
dilemma for the agency and the sharks, it did not create as much of a legal
feasibility conundrum as some of the other orders discussed earlier in this
paper. The 1997 quotas had been published as permanent regulations that
would remain in place as annual quotas until superceded. As long as the
judge continued to strike down new agency rules superceding the 1997
quotas, the 1997 quotas remained enforceable and on the books.
F West Coast Groundfish
1. Amendment 12
NMFS manages the Pacific coast groundfish fishery pursuant to an
FMP developed by the Pacific Fishery Management Council. In December
2000, NMFS approved Amendment 12 to the FMP Amendment 12
provided framework procedures for developing rebuilding plans, for setting
guidelines for rebuilding plan contents, and for sending rebuilding plans to
NMFS for review and approval/disapproval, and was intended to satisfy the
224. SOFA 11, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 1346.
225. Id. at 1345.
226. Id. at 1346-47.
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Magnuson-Stevens Act's requirements for rebuilding plans. Two weeks
later, NMFS approved the final harvest specifications for 2001 based on the
requirements of the FMP and Amendment 12, waiving prior notice and
comment on this part of the action.227 NMFS accepted comments on the
final rule after it was published. Pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
the FMP and the annual harvest levels must minimize bycatch to the extent
practicable and prevent overfishing.2'
NRDC challenged NMFS's implementation of the 2001 fishing
specifications for West Coast groundfish.229 The challenge alleged that the
calculations used to estimate the bycatch mortality rates, a key factor in
determining whether bycatch was being minimized, were arbitrary; that
NMFS violated the APA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act by not providing
for advance notice and public comment on proposed specifications; that the
underlying FMP (Amendment 12) on which the rebuilding portions of the
specifications were based did not comply in form with the requirements of
the Magnuson-Stevens Act; that the FMP's authorization of overfishing
under the "mixed stock exception" violated the Magnuson-Stevens Act; and
that the EAs prepared for both Amendment 12 and the 2001 groundfish
specifications were inadequate because they failed to consider a reasonable
range of alternatives.'
On August 20, 2001, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on every
ground except the mixed stock exception, which it determined was not yet
ripe for review."
a. Remedy
The judge provided the following relief: (1) declaratory judgment that
the 2001 specifications were legally inadequate; (2) an order that the
agency reassess the 2001 specifications using a legally adequate discard
mortality rate; (3) an order that NMFS provide adequate notice and
comment in promulgating future groundfish specifications; (4) an order
setting aside the portion of Amendment 12 that allows the Council to
227. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 2338 (Jan. 11, 2001). The FMP's
process for setting the specifications that year involved waiving advance notice and
comment, following consideration of biological and socioeconomic information at two
council meetings. See 50 C.F.R. § 660.321 (2000).
228. 66 Fed. Reg. 2339 (Jan. 11, 2001).
229. NRDC v. Evans, 168 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
230. Id. at 1153-60.
231. Id. at 1160-61. On January 13, 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the portion of the
lower court's ruling that had found NMFS to be in non-compliance with notice and comment
requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. NRDC. v. Evans, 316 F.3d 904,913 (9th Cir.
2003).
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develop rebuilding plans that are not in the format required by the
Magnuson-Stevens Act (FMP, FMP amendment, or proposed regulations);
and (5) an order setting aside the EAs prepared for the Amendment 12 and
the 2001 specifications, and remanding them to the agency for further
consideration. 232
While the court did not enjoin the agency from enforcing the 2001
quota, it did declare that quota legally inadequate.33 However, much of the
2001 quota had already been taken by the time the court ruled.
b. NMFS's Implementation
NMFS responded by immediately undertaking a new analysis of
bycatch rates and undertaking development of a new approach for
formulating specifications using prior notice and comment. To the extent
that Amendment 12 had been set aside, the agency had to find a new way
to comply with the Magnuson-Stevens Act's rebuilding requirements. On
January 11, 2002, the agency published an emergency rule to manage the
fishery through February and simultaneously published a proposed rule that
would regulate the fishery for the remainder of the year.' NMFS stated
in the emergency rule that it planned to work with the Council to revise the
method of implementing annual specifications for future years.'
2. Amendment 13
In a related case, environmental plaintiffs had also challenged
Amendment 13 to the West Coast Groundfish FMP.23 Amendment 13 had
been intended to bring the FMP into compliance with the SFA's require-
ments regarding bycatch assessment and avoidance. NMFS had previously
disapproved Amendment 11, due to the fact that it failed to analyze all
practicable alternatives to the current year-round trip limit management
system. In developing Amendment 13, the Council considered a range of
alternatives for minimizing bycatch, including capacity reduction, marine
reserves, a vessel incentive program, and discard caps, but implemented
only a voluntary increased utilization program. The FMP also listed
bycatch reduction measures that might be implemented in the future.
232. NRDC v. Evans, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-61.
233. Id.
234. Magnuson-Stevens.Act Provisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 1540 (Jan. 11, 2002); Magnuson-
Stevens Act Provisions, 67 Fed. Reg. 1555 (Jan. 11, 2002).
235. Id. at 1540-41.
236. Pacific Marine Conservation Council, Inc. v. Evans, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1194,
1196-97 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment).
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The Amendment was supported by an EA/FONSI which considered
four alternatives for implementing a standardized reporting methodology,
including status quo (no new observer programs beyond those already in
place), and mandatory logbook reporting. In approving Amendment 13,
NMFS noted that "states are now implementing a largely government-
funded observer program."" 7 The Amendment provided that NMFS "may
implement" an observer program, but did not require such a program.
At the time of approving Amendment 13, NMFS had an observer
program in place, but was on record stating that the limited scope of that
program, and lack of funding for expanding it, would not result in reliable
data to support new discard estimates. NMFS was on record stating that it
lacked adequate data on bycatch in the fishery, that the absence of data
hampered its ability to manage the fishery, and that "critical information on
the portion of catch that is discarded at sea is available only through the
placement of onboard observers." 238
The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that Amendment 13
did not comply with the Magnuson-Stevens Act requirement that FMPs
include a standardized reporting methodology to assess bycatch and did not
adequately analyze alternatives; and that NMFS had failed to explain the




On April 12, 2002, the court remanded Amendment 13 to the agency
for further consideration in light of its ruling. 
3. Plaintiff's Attempt to Enforce the Timelines
After the court's remand, NMFS began the process of developing
Amendment 16, that would bring the FMP into compliance with the court's
orders, utilizing the procedures set forth in the Magnuson-Stevens Act,
which requires involvement of the fishery management council. NMFS
began development of both a short-term and a long-term EIS. NMFS also
engaged in settlement discussions with the plaintiffs from April 2002 to
October 2002. As of November 2002, NMFS's projected schedule for
completing Amendment 16 was Fall 2003.
237. Fisheries off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific, 66 Fed. Reg. 29,729,
29,732 (June 1, 2001).
238. Pacific Marine Conservation Council, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1198.
239. Id. at 1206-07.
240. Id. at 1207.
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On November 20, 2002, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking new remedies
for both the Amendment 12 and the Amendment 13 cases." Plaintiffs
alleged that NMFS was in violation of Congressionally mandated deadlines
that required the agency to implement rebuilding plans within twenty-one
months of a species being listed as overfished if a council had failed to act
by that time. Plaintiffs also alleged that NMFS was required to implement
bycatch requirements since the original Congressional deadline had been
1998.
In an opinion that highlights the complexities of fisheries litigation and
remedies, the court wrestles with fundamental questions of how to craft an
appropriate remedy in this specific context, how to incorporate the
necessary science, how to consider the necessary impacts, and how to
respond to a management process that is "glacially slow."
This court could reasonably find that the agency's action is
contrary to law and therefore the Plaintiffs win, but then where are
we? It is one thing for a court to enjoin an agency action, then
revoke a regulation and order an agency to stop. How does a court
force an agency to do its job within the time required by law?
Most of the cases this court has found on this issue involve an
agency's enacting a regulation which violates the intent of
Congress. The court then steps in and orders the agency to cease
and desist. In the case at bar, Plaintiffs ask the court to apply the
standard to an agency's failure to take action in the time-frame
mandated by Congress. Most of the fish species at issue in this
case were identified as overfished in 1999, and the measures which
this court ordered taken in August 2001 have yet to be imple-
mented, and it's been three years, going on four. Defendants have
been actively engaged in pursuing measures to reach the goals of
the MSA and the regulations and to comply with the orders of this
court. The process has just been glacially slow. Setting new
deadlines would probably be futile, unless the court were willing
to assume an active role, perhaps by appointing a special master at
defendant's expense. Decades will pass before some of the fish
species at issue are predicted to recover. Defendants spend a
portion of their budget each year to buy fishing boats from captains
who are leaving the fishery and to pay to retrain their crews for
other work. This court perceives a need for restraint and patience.
In the larger context, the court must balance the survival of the fish
and the survival of the fishermen. Plaintiffs at this time present no
241. NRDC v. Evans, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1047-48 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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concrete recommendations as to how Defendants should implement
the mandate of Congress. Where is the science to support a
shorter timeline than the agency proposes? While they are legally
correct, Plaintiffs offer no remedy which will produce the desired
result. The court is reluctant to issue orders without an adequate
technical and scientific foundation. However, the court will not
throw up its hands and abdicate its responsibility to see that the
will of Congress is met, eventually. 2
In the end, the court denied the plaintiff's motion, but required NMFS to
report periodically on its progress.
G The Monkfish's Tale
NMFS declared monkfish to be overfished in 1997, and implemented
a monkfish FMP in 1999. The FMP established a limited access system
with different categories of permits, and established different trip limits for
vessels in the different qualification categories and using different types of
gears. For example, in the southern region the following trip limits were
implemented depending on the type of monkfish permit the vessel holds
and the type of gear the vessel uses: (1) for category A and C vessels using
mobile gear, a landing limit of 1,500 pound tail-weight or 4,980 pound
whole weight; (2) for category B and D vessels using mobile gear, a landing
limit of 1,000 pound tail-weight or 3,320 pound whole weight; and (3) for
any vessel using fixed gear, a landing limit of 300 pound tail-weight or 996
pound whole weight.' 3
The gillnetters challenged this disparate treatment alleging violations
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act's national standards. The court agreed with
the plaintiffs' finding that the trip limits were not based on the best
available scientific information, that there was no documentation that the
trip limits resulted in equitable proportions among categories, and that there
was nothing in the record to demonstrate that the limits were fair and
equitable to all "monkfishermen."' "
242. id. at 1058-59.
243. Fisheries of the Northeastern U.S., 64 Fed. Reg. 54,732, 54,733, 54,734 (Oct. 7,
1999). In the monkfish fishery, there are three gear types: trawls, dredges, and gillnets. The
term "fixed gear" effectively refers to gillnets. The term "non-trawl" would appear literally
to encompass both dredges and gillnets. However, because there were separate rules for
dredges in the monkfish fishery, the only remaining gear type to be governed by the general
non-trawl rules was gillnet gear.
244. Hall v. Evans, 165 F. Supp. 2d 114, 145-48 (D.R.I. 2001).
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1. Remedy
On August 14,2001, the court issued an order enjoining the 300 pound
trip limit for non-trawlers and establishing a 1,500 pound trip limit for all
vessels.
[T]he imposition of the 300 [pound] limit on non-trawlers is
arbitrary and capricious. It is hereby vacated and all monk fisher-
men will be governed by the 1,500 [pound] limit until such time as
the Secretary establishes a fair and equitable gear differential or
otherwise revises the catch limit for all monk fishermen. s
This order raises some interesting issues from both legal and practical
perspectives. It addresses the plaintiff's primary concern that they be
allowed to catch more fish. However, while the lawsuit challenged only the
300/1,500 pound differential for vessels in the A and C categories, the
judge's order appears to apply a 1,500 pound trip limit to categories B and
D as well. The immediate result is that a variety of vessels will be able to
catch more fish. Perhaps even more than 1,500 pounds, since, when the
judge vacates the existing trip limits, there is nothing remaining in terms of
regulations to limit the fishery. NMFS is without legal authority to enforce
a different set of quotas unless it engages in rulemaking, pursuant to the
Magnuson-Stevens Act, to implement them. The legal result may be that
some categories of vessels are fishing open access. Also, from a practical
perspective, the increase in catch that the court order authorizes may trigger
a variety of unintended impacts.
H. Essential Fish Habitat
In 1996, the Sustainable Fisheries Act amended the Magnuson-Stevens
Act to require that fishery management councils amend their FMPs to
"describe and identify essential fish habitat [(EFH)]. .. [and] minimize to
the extent practicable [the] adverse effects on such habitat caused by
fishing.... ."' In addition, the new law established requirements for other
federal agencies to consult with the Secretary when undertaking actions
that could adversely affect essential fish habitat.' The consultation
provisions further require that the Secretary make recommendations to
consulting agencies about measures to conserve EFH, and for the consult-
ing agencies to provide a written response explaining which measures they
245. Id. at 117-18.
246. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, sec. 108, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
247. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(b)(2) (2000).
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will be adopting and which not, and providing reasons if they have chosen
not to adopt the recommendations?' s
After NMFS had approved the Council-recommended EFH amend-
ments to FMPs around the country, environmental plaintiffs filed suit
alleging NEPA and Magnuson-Stevens Act violations.2 9 For each of the
challenged FMP amendments, the NEPA documents were EA/FONSIs.
Plaintiffs complained that NMFS had not considered alternative EFH
designations to what the Councils had recommended.' NMFS argued in
its defense that pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, its decision making
authority with regard to Council recommendations is limited to approval,
partial approval, or disapproval. The Magnuson-Stevens Act does not
provide a mechanism for secretarial modification of Council submissions.
The court expressed concern that NMFS did not consider alternative
designations of EFH, nor measures for further reducing the impacts of
fishing gears. The court concluded that these EAs did not address the
necessary factors for determining whether an EIS was necessary, were
inadequate in scope, did not consider a reasonable range of alternatives,
and did not present adequate analyses of impacts. 25'
1. Remedy
The court's remedy was to enjoin the agency from enforcing the EFH
amendments ending completion of a new analysis:
Because the public interest would be served by enjoining the
Secretary's actions until such time as he can identify and evaluate
all alternatives to the EFH Amendments, this Court will enter an
injunction against the enforcement of those Amendments until the
Secretary performs a new, thorough, and legally adequate EA or
EIS for each EFH Amendment, in compliance with the require-
ments of NEPA. 252
Compare this result to the judge's enjoining of the crustacean fishery in the
monk seal case. If read literally, these orders appear to prevent NMFS from
doing the thing that the litigants, and perhaps the judge, were trying to
achieve.
248. Id.
249. American Oceans Campaign, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
250. Id. at 9.
251. Id. at 20.
252. ld. at21.
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L New England Groundfish
In November 1999, NMFS approved Amendment 9 to the New
England Groundfish FMP. Amendment 9 included overfishing defini-
tions intended to bring the FMP into compliance with the 1996 SFA
amendments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act. Subsequently, NMFS
determined that Amendment 9 could not be implemented due to techni-
cal flaws, and began development of a new amendment to replace
Amendment 9. Before the replacement of Amendment 9 was completed,
NMFS approved a regulatory action, labeled Framework 33,3 that
allowed fishing at higher levels than would have been allowed under
Amendment 9.-
On May 19, 2000, the Conservation Law Foundation sued NMFS
alleging that it had violated the SFA by failing to give effect to Amend-
ment 9, and that both Framework 33 and Amendment 9 violated SFA's
bycatch provisions and the APA by failing to require adequate assess-
ment and minimization of bycatch.255 NMFS argued that technical flaws
prevented the agency from implementing Amendment 9 and that Frame-
work 33 adequately protected the fishery pending completion of a new
FMP amendment that would comply with the SFA. With respect to the
bycatch allegation, NMFS claimed that the SFA did not necessitate
implementation of new bycatch measures because those already in place
were adequate.
The court found that Framework 33 did not comply with the under-
lying FMP and violated the SFA because it allowed fishing at levels up
to three times higher than those approved in Amendment 9, and because
it was allowing overfishing to occur. The probability of Framework 33
achieving the rebuilding requirements mandated in the SFA were too
low. Echoing the standard articulated by the D.C. Circuit in NRDC v.
Daley,' the court stated that in order "[t]o comply with the SFA as a
matter of law, Defendants must show that there is at least a [fifty per-
cent] probability that Framework 33 can meet the targets set by the SFA
and the relevant FMP."
With respect to NMFS's argument that technical flaws prevented it
from implementing Amendment 9, the court held that NMFS's approval
253. Fisheries of the Northeastern U.S., 65 Fed. Reg. 21,658 (Apr. 24, 2000).
254. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2001).
255. Id. at 11.
256. 209 F.3d 747, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
257. Conservation Law Found, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 19-20.
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of the amendment precluded the use of that defense.2" In addition, the
court found evidence in the record indicating that NMFS could have
possibly implemented all or part of the amendment. 9 With respect to
NMFS's duty to report, assess, and minimize bycatch, the court found
that the record did not support the agency's conclusion that existing
measures were sufficient. 6'
1. Remedy
This case presented a factual situation in which a mandamus order
could have been appropriate relief for a Magnuson-Stevens Act viola-
tion, due to the fact that NMFS had already approved an FMP amend-
ment. The court could have simply ordered the agency to implement
what it had already approved."' However, the remedial phase actually
became more complex than any we have discussed thus far. Because the
court and all parties agreed that new information on the fishery indicated
that factual basis for the approval of Amendment 9 was no longer valid,
and that ordering the agency to implement Amendment 9 would have
created absurd results, the court directed the parties to engage in media-
tion. 2 As of April 16, 2002, with the fishing season scheduled to open
on May 1, 2002, some but not all of the parties had been able to reach
agreement on terms of a possible settlement. The agreeing parties
submitted to the court a proposed "Settlement Agreement Among
Certain Parties."'  Three environmental plaintiffs and one intervenor
from the seafood industry objected to the proposed agreement.' After
considering the proposed settlement agreement as well as the positions
of the non-settling parties, the court crafted its own remedy that started
with components of the settlement agreement as a baseline, but added
various requirements to what the parties had proposed. The court
described the various factors it had weighed and considered in crafting
an appropriate remedy as follows:
Fashioning an appropriate remedy has been one of the hardest tasks
this Court has ever undertaken. The livelihood-indeed the way
258. Id. at 10-11.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 15.
261. In its initial summary judgment decision, the court stated that NMFS "can, and
must, give effect to Amendment 9." Id. at 23-24.
262. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 195 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188-89 (D.D.C. 2002).
263. Id. at 189.
264. Id. at 190.
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of life--of many thousands of individuals, families, small busi-
nesses, and maritime communities will be affected. The economy
of state and local governments in the region will therefore undoubt-
edly be impacted in turn. The future of a precious natural resource
-- the once-rich, vibrant and healthy--and now severely depleted
New England Northeast fishery-is at stake. All of these diverse
interests must be respected and considered, as the then National
Standards set forth in the Magnuson-Stevens Act mandate.. .. '
Thus, the Court has concluded... that it is appropriate to use the
Settlement Agreement Among Certain Parties as a baseline
remedy.... Some additions.., have been made to the terms of
the Settlement Agreement where the Court felt that certain
provisions could be strengthened in terms of reducing over-fishing
and minimizing bycatch without risking the lives of fishermen or
endangering the future of their communities and their way of
life.2
The court issued an order that included thirty-six specific management
measures, ranging from bag limits, effort limitations known as "days-at-
sea" (DAS), closed areas, and minimum fish sizes, to observer coverage
requirements.267 The court order required the
265. Id.
266. Id. at 192.
267. Conservation Law Found., 195 F. Supp. 2d at 195-98. For example, some of the
specific measures in the order included:
A. Effective May 1, 2002 to July 31, 2002, for all vessels fishing under a multispecies
DAS, the Amended Interim Rule, containing the following measures, shall apply:
1. Restrict vessels from fishing more than [twenty-five] percent of their allocated DAS
during May through July.
2. Count multispecies DAS as a minimum of [fifteen] hours, for any trip longer than
three hours.
3. Prohibit "front loading" of the DAS clock (require that vessels leave port within
one hour after calling into the DAS program to prevent vessels from accumulating
time for the purposes of fishing Gulf of Maine cod).
4. Close the inshore Western Gulf of Maine closure area....
13. Vessels intending to charter/party fish in the Gulf of Maine closed areas must
"declare into charter/party fishery" for the duration of the closure or for three months
whichever is greater....
B. Effective August 1, 2002, until promulgation of Amendment 13, for all vessels
fishing under a multispecies DAS, the Second Amended Interim Rule, containing the
following measures, shall apply:
1. Freeze DAS at the average DAS used during the base period of May 1, 1996 to
April 30, 2001, not to exceed the current allocation. Vessels are not entitled to any
minimum DAS other than their average during the five-year base period. For limited
access vessels not operating under the call-in system during the period May 1996
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Secretary of Commerce to implement the management measures by
regulations and by certain dates specified in the order.2
through June 1996, a vessel's DAS will be based on vessel trip reports submitted to
NMFS before April 9,2002. Otherwise, DAS will be based on NMFS' call-in system.
2. DAS will be reduced by twenty percent from the baseline set forth in Paragraph
B 1.
3. Any latent effort permit not used in 2001 may not be activated.
4. The minimum size for cod that may be sold shall be twenty-two inches.
5. For all gear sectors, NMFS shall provide five percent observer coverage, or higher,
if necessary to provide statistically reliable data. Effective*May 1, 2003, NMFS shall
provide ten percent observer coverage for all gear sectors, unless it can establish by
the most reliable and current scientific information available that such increase is not
necessary....
7. Freeze issuance of new open access hand-gear permits to any vessel that has never
been issued such permit, or has not applied for such permit, as of August 1, 2002.
8. Prohibit "front loading" of the DAS clock for all areas (require that vessels leave
port within one hour after calling into the DAS program to prevent vessels from
accumulating time).
9. Continue Western Gulf of Maine year round closure, unless modified by amendment.
10. Prohibit use of de-hookers or "crucifiers" with no less than six-inch spacing
between the fairlead rollers....
25. The boundary for the Southern New England measures... is as follows:








(*) South facing shoreline of Cape Cod
(**) Southward to its intersection with the EEZ
(b) Bounded on the west by:
A line beginning at the intersection of 74o00' longitude and the south facing shoreline
of Long Island, NY, and then running southward along the 74o00 longitude line. Id.
195-97.
268. Id. The court was clearly aware of the obligations it was placing on the agency,
stating:
The Court is of course aware that there are some differences between the provisions
of the Settlement Agreement submitted by certain parties which were to be incorpo-
rated into the First and Second Interim Rules and the final Remedial Order being
entered today.... In any event, the present Remedial Order includes those departures,
and only those departures, from the Settlement Agreement which the Court deemed
essential to meet the demands of the statute. The Government will need to publish in
the Federal Register, as quickly as possible, the Amended Interim Rule and Amended
Second Interim Rule to include the departures from the Settlement Agreement
incorporated in the Remedial Order.
Id. at 198 n.2.
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Several parties, including NMFS, moved for reconsideration. Among
other things, NMFS argued that the "Amended Remedial Order represents
a mandamus order requiring federal officials to promulgate specific rules
in the Code of Federal Regulations that will subject both parties and non-
parties alike to potential civil and criminal penalties."'  NMFS stated that
non-parties had not been afforded an opportunity to comment, and that the
Amended Remedial Order had not been promulgated pursuant to the
analytical and procedural requirements of other applicable laws, such as
NEPA and the Magnuson-Stevens Act.' Finally, NMFS pointed out that
mandamus orders are appropriate only in cases where the duty to act is not
only authorized, but nondiscretionary.27
On May 23, 2002, the court vacated its April 26, 2002 Remedial Order
and ordered that the "Settlement Agreement Among Certain Parties" be
implemented in its original form with the addition of certain observer
coverage requirements. 2 The court did not address NMFS's mandamus
argument, but rather hinged its decision on the fact that the April 26, 2002
order would have produced unintended results and caused grave economic
and social hardship.3 The court currently retains jurisdiction over this
case as the parties work towards deadlines to implement a revised FMP.
IV. ANALYSIS OF REMEDIES
Having reviewed the current trends in fisheries injunctions, we will
now consider the possible friction between some of these remedies and our
notions of separation of powers, and whether the outcome of these lawsuits
comports with the best interests of the litigants, the public, and the
resource.
As mentioned previously, crafting effective judicial remedies to
procedural violations of fishery management laws requires sensitivity to the
regulatory status quo ante and the exact meanings of the orders themselves
in light of underlying regulations on the books. While some of the
injunctions we have just discussed in effect do nothing more than strike
down an unsupported agency action in accordance with the APA, others
appear to go far beyond this familiar boundary. For example, while the
judge in the shark case"' may appear to be setting a new quota contrary to
269. Id. Federal Defendants' motion for reconsideration.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 211 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
273. Id.
274. SOFA I, 995 F. Supp. at 1411.
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the one proposed by the agency, what he is actually doing is striking down
agency actions that would have changed the status quo, the status quo being
the 1997 quotas already on the books. This is nothing new. Contrast, on
the other hand, the Hawaii longline case,275 in which the court's order
required the agency to take regulatory action implementing very specific
management measures in the Pacific Ocean; and with the monkfish case,276
in which the court replaced a variety of quotas with the new 1,500 pound
limit for all. In the Hawaii longline case, the judge required proactive
agency rulemaking to implement his management regime. In the monkfish
case, the judge's order striking down the agency's quotas, in effect, left no
regulations on the books, and called into question how the agency would
enforce the 1,500 pound limit against fishermen to whom existing
regulations did not apply.
The line between what may work legally in terms of a fisheries
injunction and what may not is fuzzy at best, but jurisprudence on the issue
of mandamus may provide a few helpful considerations as this area of law
develops further. The key point that emerges is that, in the tradition of
Marbury v. Madison, compelling an agency to implement a specific
outcome can be complicated at best, particularly if a statute vests discretion
with the agency. In cases where the agency has discretion, such as in
developing FMPs under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, judicial relief may
well be limited to striking down the agency's action.
Whether we agree or disagree with the ultimate validity of any of the
judicial orders previously discussed, it is interesting to consider the net
results of these injunctions from the perspectives of the litigants, the
resources, and the public.
A. Steller Sea Lion
From a technical legal perspective, the injunction issued in the Steller
sea lion case' seems to work. The court's finding of a procedural
violation of the ESA gave the agency a basis to utilize its ESA regulatory
authorities to prevent further violations until the procedural flaw was
corrected. However, this outcome may have been unattractive from a
political perspective, as exemplified by the appropriations rider directing
that future management decisions originate through the Magnuson-Stevens
Act council process.
275. Leatherback Sea Turtle, 1999 WL 33594329, at *1.
276. Hall, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 117-18.
277. Greenpeace, No. C98-49Z (W.D. Wash. Aug. 7,2000).
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At times, the controversy was so heated that it appeared Congress
might respond with a repeal of the ESA, or at least the creation of a "snail
darter-like" exception for the North Pacific, or even a convening of the God
Squad. Although Congress's intervention prohibiting implementation of
the 2000 RPA may have been a slight set back to the Steller sea lions, the
phased-in protections may have struck a balance that would have avoided
jeopardizing sea lions while still enabling an important U.S. fishery to
continue to exist during the development of a workable long-term RPA.
Also, Congress responded positively by providing much needed funding to
support efforts to gather information on predator prey relationships in the
North Pacific ecosystems, new information which ultimately should benefit
all the parties involved.
Litigants may perceive that litigation has helped them achieve their
goals in this case. It is likely that the new information that will be
produced will enhance the management of the fishery and should benefit
protected species. On the other hand, the agency has devoted a great deal
of resources attempting to develop a comprehensive plan based on
relatively little data. This raises the question of whether agency resources
are being best utilized.
B. Summer Flounder
It is hard to capture the net results of the summer flounder litigation in
a tidy summary of pros and cons because the issues are so complex and
numerous. However, at its heart, this line of cases is really about alloca-
tions. The NRDC cases27 sought for NMFS to set more conservative
quotas, and the North Carolina Fisheries Association cases9 promoted
letting fishermen take more fish. This is the kind of resource allocation
issue that the Magnuson-Stevens Act is designed to address through public
process. One might conclude that the effect of the litigation was to take the
debate out of the Council forum, in which the interested members of the
public fight for their perspectives before a single decision-making body,
and into the courts, in which a narrower group of interests fight for their
perspectives before a wider variety of decision-making bodies.
278. See NRDC v. Daley l, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 102; NRDC v. Daley 11, 209 F.3d at 747.
279. See N.C. Fisheries Ass'n 1, 16 F. Supp 2d at 647; NC. Fisheries Ass'n 11, 27 F.
Supp. 2d at 650.
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C. Hawaii Longline
From a technical legal perspective, this case,' resulting in a series of
five court ordered rules managing the fishery, highlights the separation of
powers questions discussed above and raises questions about what
additional findings a court may need to make in concluding that one set of
management measures is a nondiscretionary duty that the agency is
obligated to implement.
From a practical perspective, the results may have been positive. All
the affected interests were present in the lawsuit and were able to express
their concerns to the court. The management measures erred on the side of
precaution, protecting the resource pending development of new analyses.
The development of the new analyses will likely aid in improving
management for all involved. However, the public was cut out of the
rulemaking process. In addition, there may be some unintended ramifica-
tions of the court ordered management measures regarding relocation of
fishing effort.
D. Monk Seals
The monk seal case" exemplifies how a court order can sometimes
have unintended results. By striking down the agency's regulatory
authority to close the fishery, the court seems to have technically under-
mined the results it intended to accomplish. Even if the court's order had
accomplished what it was intended to accomplish, it would not have
provided any additional protections for the resource beyond what the
agency was already doing-closing the fishery and developing new
analyses. One consequence that may have actually harmed the resource
was that the court order foreclosed research that could have provided
additional important information about the predator prey relationships the
agency was trying to understand.
E. Shark
Technically, the injunctions issued in the shark case 2 seem to comport
with the relief delineated by the APA. Because of the underlying regula-
tory regime on the books in the Code of Federal Regulations, the judge was
able to maintain the 1997 quotas indefinitely by simply striking down each
280. Leatherback Sea Turtle, 1999 WL 33594329, at *I.
281. Hall, 165 F. Supp. 2dat 114.
282. SOFA 1, 995 F. Supp. at 1411.
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subsequent agency action. This result appears to have been good for the
litigants as well-at least in the short run. They were able to accomplish
their short-term economic objectives of harvesting more sharks, although
it remains to be seen what the long-term biological effects on the fishery
may be.
From a public participation perspective, this case demonstrates the cost
to the public of having management taken out of the agency's hands. Not
only was the public excluded from participating in the development of
shark quotas, but the organization that originally requested the 1997
rulemaking was denied the opportunity to intervene.
E West Coast Groundfish
The ultimate resolution of the West Coast groundfish case 283 remains
to be seen, but, as of this writing, NMFS is proceeding with developing
management measures pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act procedures
by submitting regular progress reports to the court. On one hand, the
Fishery Management Council has indicated that delays in developing FMP
amendments have been due in part to the litigation itself. On the other
hand, although the plaintiffs did not win the ultimate remedy they sought
in terms of the schedule for the implementation of the new plans, as a result
of the litigation, the agency is reevaluating measures with which the
plaintiffs were not satisfied. It will be interesting to observe whether this
litigation has any long term effect on how the environmental community
participates in the Magnuson-Stevens Act process, and whether it has any
effect on how NMFS and the Council respond to participation of the
environmental community.
G Monkfish and Essential Fish Habitat
The orders in the monkfish and EFH cases' provide additional
examples of how injunctions can lead to confusion if there is not a clear
linkage to the underlying regulatory regime. The technical legal readings
of these two orders seem to effect results far beyond what the litigants and
the courts intended.
283. NRDC v. Evans, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
284. Hall, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 114; American Oceans Campaign, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
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H. New England Groundfish
Although the unusual factual situation surrounding the New England
groundfish case 5 may have given rise to one of the rare occasions in which
mandamus would have been an appropriate remedy, the court and the
parties agreed that forcing NMFS to implement Amendment 9 would have
produced absurd and undesirable results. Ascertaining an appropriate
remedy that accounts for the various legal requirements and public policy
considerations continues to challenge all the parties involved.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, our review of the legal authorities for issuance and
implementation of fishery management injunctions indicates that there are
many complexities involved when a plaintiff requests a court to order an
agency to implement a particular management regime. An agency must
carefully consider what a court is expecting in terms of implementing or
complying with an injunction, particularly if the injunction is intended to
impose a new regulatory regime on the fishery. An agency may not
disregard underlying regulatory and statutory schemes already in place. To
the extent the court is requiring the agency to engage in rulemaking to
effect a particular result, such an order may constitute "mandamus."
That said, future litigants should be aware of several considerations
when deciding whether or not to pursue their objectives through litigation.
First, while this paper has focused on remedies that have resulted when
NMFS has lost a lawsuit, overall NMFS wins the majority of its fishery
management related litigation.' Some plaintiffs may never get to the
remedy phase. Those who do pursue litigation should be aware of the
extensive reach ofjudicial jurisdiction and, when considering the costs and
benefits of litigation, should be aware of the potential for unanticipated
results when the power for managing fisheries is transferred from the
agency and the public to the judiciary. Litigation shifts the balance of the
interests represented in the decision making process away from open public
participation. The Magnuson-Stevens Act is intended to provide stake-
holders a forum for working out their differences early in the process.
Before resorting to litigation, parties should attempt to work through the
statutory process designed to give them a voice in the development of
management measures.
285. Conservation Law Found., 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1.
286. See supra note 6.
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